

ISSUE VOTING IN A POLARIZED ERA:
IDEOLOGY, CONSTITUENCIES AND POLICY-MAKING IN CONGRESS

By

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Abstract

Polarization in the modern Congress creates an atmosphere in which the liberal to conservative ideological structure dominates political conflict. Members of Congress (MCs) vote principally based on their own ideological preferences with relative stability, and there is evidence that preferences are diverging between the two major parties. But in a system of district-based representation, MCs must consider the implications of their voting behavior on their electoral fortunes. In a geographically vast multicultural and multiethnic democracy like the United States, regional variety in economic incentives and cultural perspectives means that each legislator faces unique concerns. In previous eras, regional disputes like slavery, “free silver,” or civil rights provided the dominant divisions within parties. In the contemporary Congress, marked by its evident and growing polarization, can issue politics still provide an important dimension in congressional decision-making? Or should ideological models that incorporate issue politics guide our understanding? This research considers issue voting in an era of polarization and explores the impact of these diverse interests on policy voting in Congress. The results suggest that dimensionality, or the appearance of multiple dimensions of preferences beyond the typical liberal-conservative continuum, are evident in the modern Congress. In looking at salient policy issue

areas like environmental, immigration and abortion policy, there is evidence of a voting calculus that incorporates the concerns of district economic and cultural interests. Since some MCs may prioritize their primary constituency above general election interests, these issue dimensions can be suppressed. These findings help shape an understanding of voting behavior within Congress and our understanding of representation in American democracy.

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Polarization, Ideology and Issue Politics

In 1840, remarking on the state of political parties in the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: “In America, the two parties were in agreement on most essential points... as a consequence, neither of them effected the existence of a great number of individuals ([1840] 2003:204).” Woodrow Wilson echoed this argument 45 years later he found America lacking strong parties “essential for the formation of an active and effective public opinion ([1885] 1925:186-1870).” In 1950, the American Political Science Association (APSA) issued a report arguing that political parties needed to become stronger and more distinguished from one another to provide a “broader political base (16).” For over a century, major political commentators argued that the absence of distinct and divided parties threatened the very foundations of American democracy. These observers desired a more divided political system, with so-called responsible parties taking consistently opposing issue positions so that voters could easily distinguish between their choices.

The modern U.S. Congress provides an excellent example of being careful what you wish for. The *Pew Research Center* declared recently, “political

polarization is the defining feature of early 21st century American politics, both among the public and elected officials (Doherty 2014).” The divisions within American political opinion are no longer marked by the historic regional splits that slavery, bimetallism, and civil rights created in the public and in Congress. The 114th Congress (2015-2016) will feature only three Democratic senators from the South (Nelson D-FL; Kaine and Warner D-VA) and two Republicans from New England (Snowe R-ME; Ayotte R-NH). In 1995, when the 104th Senate took its seats, there were seven Republican senators in New England and ten Southern Democrats. In that Congress, nine states in the New England and Southern regions split their Senate delegations. In the 114th, just four states in these regions had split delegations, including two with an independent senator.

Polarization can most simply be defined as the division of political attitudes into liberal and conservative camps (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006, 3). This definition is sufficient and covers the modern usage of journalists, congressional scholars, and politicians. But it may be more useful to distinguish polarization as a process from polarization as a state of affairs (DiMaggio 1996). If we take as a starting point the 1950 report from the APSA Committee on Political Parties, there is wide agreement that the Congress has undergone decades of polarization (process), creating an atmosphere where polarization (the state of affairs) is now the “defining feature” of the political landscape.

Tocqueville, Wilson, and the APSA committee on parties were no doubt influenced by a reverence for the parliamentary discipline of European democracies (Polsby and Schickler 2002). The APSA report centers around “responsible” parties, both the governing and the opposition. In this current polarized environment, where parties and the public are thoroughly divided into “liberals” and “conservatives,” why does Congress not function like a party or coalition dominated parliamentary system? In the Congresses that saw unified control of both houses of Congress and the Presidency (107th, 108th, 109th, 111th) did these polarized coalitions develop the dominant party government that the APSA report and others expected? Unfortunately, depending on your point of view, ideologically divided political parties and unified control did not usher in an era of productive lawmaking. Instead legislative gridlock retained its status as a “common but not constant” feature of the U.S. Congress (Krehbiel 1998, 5).

Voting Behavior in Congress: Ideology and Beyond

The calculus made in voting decisions of members of Congress (MCs) has been a subject of rigorous scholarly debate. The importance of parties, constituents, and ideology have all been cited as key influences on the roll call votes for MCs (Miller and Stokes 1963, Clausen 1973, Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Poole and Daniels 1985, Cox and McCubbins 2005, Smith 2007, Lee 2009). Yet political scientists and commentators alike have come to focus on ideology as measured

on a single dimension from liberal to conservative as the dominant model of legislative preferences (Converse 1964, Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Though there is opposition to this concept (see Lee 2009, Crespín and Rhode 2010), the categorization of legislative preferences seems to be a single street with a camp on the left, and on the right (Hotelling 1929).

The current generation of congressional scholars has produced a model of legislative behavior that looks much different than early studies of congressional decision-making. A focus on the role of ideology has replaced an emphasis on the agency and individual calculus of MCs. Studies of the individual's role in Congress produced a model that stressed economic calculus and reelection goals. These studies moved from a focus on a large number of influences and institutions that affect voting (Kingdon 1981, originally 1969) to Mayhew's (1974) conception of MCs as singularly focused on electoral goals. Studies of MCs outside of the Capitol demonstrated how they interacted in their district (Fenno 1978), how entrepreneurial legislators created "enterprises" to increase their power and influence (Loomis 1990), and the how constituencies influenced voting behavior (Miller and Stokes 1963). Constituency influences have been demonstrated in studies of the 1824 Congress (Carson and Engstrom 2005) and other political development studies (Schickler 2001). But not all constituency influence is equal. Fenno (1978) stressed the importance of personal and

reelection constituencies, while others have conceptualized a “sub-constituency” or “prospective constituency” that focused on the constituency of swing voters and interests as the most influential for MCs (Bishin 2000). For these scholars, there is an individual calculus to voting beyond ideology. The constituency a MC comes from, and the electoral considerations that environment creates is crucial.

Others reject this individual based model of congressional decision making in favor of an ideology-centered approach. Krehbiel (1993) compared constituent variables and found that ADA scores were more effective at accounting for roll-call votes. This focus on general policy orientation or “ideology” as a model for legislative behavior has been formalized by creating ideal points for the preferences of legislators on a one or two dimensional structure of ideology (Poole and Daniels 1985, Poole and Rosenthal 1997 & 2005) and a theory of lawmaking that stresses preferences on a one-dimensional scale (Krehbiel 1998). Ideology, usually conceived as a consistent pattern of preferences held by legislators, is a troublesome idea for other congressional scholars. As Lee (2009) points out, the term ideology is not used in any article on Congress before 1940. It is hard to distinguish “ideology” from party or regional loyalty (Heckman and Snyder Jr. 1997, Lee 2009). Quantitative methods may place legislators on ideal points, however these techniques inherently capture party and district level concerns as endogenous features of ideology (Maltzman

and Smith 1994). For these authors, a conception of ideology as the only theoretically important influence on roll call voting, as argued by Krehbiel (1998), is flawed.

Clausen (1973) provides an alternative model of congressional decision-making and contends that MCs do have consistent preferences, but they vary by the issue area considered. This argument centers on the “law of categorization,” which proposes that legislators, like the everyday voter, organize their political preferences based on the category of issue being discussed. Within these distinct categories, MC’s decision making can be consistent because the areas offer distinct ideological positions. For instance, two MCs who categorize themselves as “conservative” may have differing opinions on agricultural assistance, civil liberties, and foreign involvement because of the distinct nature of those issue arenas.

Clausen focused on five categories of policy: government management, social welfare, civil liberties, international involvement and agricultural assistance. But Clausen studied the period from 1953-1964, and he notes that these need not be the same dimension over time, but some if not all are likely to reappear (Clausen 1973, 84-85). Recent studies show that these distinct issue areas can be seen in later Congresses. Crespin and Rohde (2010) find distinct voting differences in the areas of military, foreign affairs and agriculture in

appropriations voting. Talbert and Potoski (2002) used co-sponsoring data and found distinct preferences on as many as four dimensions. Even within closely related issues, like rural development and agriculture, distinct policy domains can be shown (Hurwitz et al. 2001). Later policy debates like women's issues can also be seen as distinct issue arenas (Norton 1999). Some argue that these competing issue areas show where the influence of parties is lessened by regional, individual or constituent influences (Miller and Stokes 1963, Shipan and Lowry 2001).

The unidimensional model has become almost an assumption in the modern period, as "liberal" and "conservative" approaches to the role of government characterize the beliefs of an entire country. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) in their seminal work on Congress expand the conception of preferences slightly to include a second dimension that is time sensitive, which accounts for the important, but divisive, issues of that legislative period. Classic second-dimension issues include slavery, civil rights, and bimetallism. All of these dimensions were regionally important issues that divided parties. They find that 85% of voting can be explained by accounting for preferences in these two dimensions (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 27), earlier research had a similar finding of 80% using the first dimension and 87% on the second (Poole and Daniels 1985). The first dimension ideological score created by this procedure is now a

central feature of studies on congressional voting and ideology, while the second dimension score is largely ignored. As Smith notes, the “spatial theorist does not worry about why legislators hold the policy positions they do and so treats the policy positions as exogenously determined preferences” (2007, 91).

Others who take a view similar to Clausen find these unidimensional conceptions lacking. Those concerned with specific policy positions prefer a multidimensional view of congressional preferences (Koford 1989; Maltzman and Smith 1994; Norton 1999; Snyder and Groseclose 2001; Crespin and Rhode 2010; Dougherty et al 2014). One key argument against a single dimension of preferences stresses that scaling techniques used in spatial models can identify dimensions but not disaggregate other endogenous components being captured (Smith 2007). This argument stresses that ideological first-dimension scores are the results of a statistical analysis of roll call votes rather than a categorization of votes by a true measure of ideology. Poole and Rosenthal describe this point when they say dimensional findings are “blind .. to the substance of the vote” (1997, 7). A second key argument mounted by Koford suggests that while one dimension may be clearly identified, other dimensions can be seen throughout the legislative process and they must be explained as well (1989, 960). Ideological scores based only on roll call voting ignore the complexity of policy issue dimensions that can arise in legislative proposals and committee deliberation.

Poole and Rosenthal challenge Clausen's policy-context dependent decision rule in their book, using the 95th Congress as an example to test Clausen's model against their own model that uses a procedure called NOMINATE to create ideological scores for legislators in two dimensions (1997, 54-55 & 233; Carroll et al. 2011). In their defense of a two-dimensional structure of preferences, they often miscategorize the nature of Clausen's argument. While they find that Clausen's policy areas fail to generate a separate spatial dimension, they ignore the much longer time horizon used by Clausen, as well as his contention that the policy dimensions he found may be more specific to his period of study. More importantly, these schools of thought conflict in their goals. Clausen's goal is to describe voting calculus and decisions made in Congress. Distinctively different in aim, Poole and Rosenthal work to achieve ideological scores to predict outcomes and generate effective classifications.

Finally, Poole and Rosenthal find that their model outperforms any constituency-based model. This should not be surprising, as the NOMINATE procedure inherently capture endogenous features of preferences, like constituency influences, yet they ignore the nuance of which constituency is effecting voting behavior (Fenno 1978; Bishin 2000). Voting on issues like abortion and agriculture may matter to specific parts of a personal or primary constituency due to cultural or district economic interests. Finally, the technique

used by Poole and Rosenthal may “outperform” other models, but statistical explanatory power is not always equivalent to theoretical and conceptual explanatory power. There is utility in the use of ideological voting scores, but reverting to this assumption in all cases neglects the nuance and layers used by legislators in their voting decisions.


Political Culture and the “American Mosaic”

In a diverse, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural democracy, a single structure of preferences seems unlikely to be universal. Polarized politics in the United States may create an environment in which most issues are filtered through a partisan or ideological lens. One might expect that debates over agricultural subsidies, immigration, or abortion will vary in their contentiousness and consensus across the communities in the United States. Some of this variation is due to economic interests—you may well prefer subsidies if you or your community is on the receiving end. Yet some of this variation will be the result of the cultural distinctiveness of the region as a result of migration patterns, religious development, education or other factors.

The work of Daniel Elazar (1994) on political cultures spawned a great deal of interest and research since its original formulation in the 1960s. In short, Elazar’s claim is that a federalist system of political development has created distinct patterns of belief about political action and the role of government. This

tripartite categorization defines cultures as being “traditionalistic,” “moralistic,” or “individualistic.” Traditionalistic cultures prefer maintenance of the standing moral and political order as view political action and advocacy as the realm of elites. Moralistic cultures believe that government can cure the wrongs in society through proactive policy decisions and believe in mass political participation. Finally, individualistic cultures focus on individual rationality and action; political action is meant for the good of individuals and governmental action is the result of those aims, rather than maintaining social order or promoting good policy. To overuse a phrase that will be abundant in this volume, the work has been polarizing among political scientists. The chief benefit of this categorization is its ability to explain a great number of things: party system development, variations in state policies, different local political institutions, and mass policy attitudes to name a few. Given this utility, political culture has instead become a catchall conception that has meant too many things to too many researchers. Unlike many theoretical models in modern political science, it has little to no empirical basis, no strict definitions, and no universal operationalization.

Figure 1.1 Elazar's Political Cultures



Researchers have employed Elazar's conception in a variety of research with interesting claims. While a complete review of all of the uses of culture (i.e. Wildavsky 1985) and political culture is beyond the scope of this review, there have been some interesting findings. Perhaps the best-known recent work examines how state political culture accounts for variation in statehouse liberalism (Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993). Others have found its relationship with party competition within states (Morgan and Watson 1991), animal rights policy (Lutz and Lutz 2011) and its relationship with diversity in states (Hero 1998).

Despite troublesome aspects with its operationalization and quantification, the significant findings on the impact of political culture, either in

Elazar's conception or in Lieske's (1993; 2010) work on regional subcultures, have been demonstrated on both attitudes and policy outcomes. It is possible that political culture is a variable substituted for a variety of racial, social, and political attitudes (see Hero 1998). Yet this condensation may be helpful in understanding complex interactions.

In this research, political culture will be utilized as a measure of the variation in citizen attitudes about government across the United States. Even if one has concerns with the operationalization of political culture, few would argue that the attitudes towards political action and outcomes are the same in Amarillo, Anchorage, and Anaheim, even if they elect representatives of the same party. Elazar's categorization is used here to show how cultural and political values, not just simply economic interests, show variability across states and create complicated, constituency-centered voting decisions for MCs.

Outline of the Book

In the chapters that follow I describe how policy issues continue to divide parties within Congress and add dimensions to voting decisions that are absent, disputed, or dismissed in the dominant models of congressional action. This research is modest in its goals and does not purport to offer the same type of all-encompassing theory of political parties or congressional action that are described in the following pages. The aim of this research is to provide evidence

of the nuanced political realities of the U.S. Congress in a polarized era that are distinct from the theoretical expectations of the leading theories.

In support of this goal, I will offer a few observations and then elaborate on those observations through looking at roll call voting behavior in both the House and Senate. Through the data and analysis presented in these pages, the following positions will be argued:

- Even in an era dominated by liberal-conservative ideological debates, the diversity of cultural and economic interests of legislative districts in American society create additional dimensions of preferences that MCs must consider.
- As agents of multiple principals, MCs cannot base their roll-call voting calculus purely on their own ideology. Rather, the concerns of multiple constituencies are incorporated. Policy issue dimensions create opportunities for activists, primary voters, and general election constituencies to influence roll-call voting behavior.
- The combination of persistent dimensionality of the roll call agenda and conflicting principals results in individual congressional behavior that emphasizes risk-avoidance and symbolic action on policy issues.

These positions provide answers to many pressing questions and debates within in the literature on Congress. The analysis and research presented here is new, but many of the arguments made are the product of hypotheses, theories and data collected by other scholars.

Chapter Two takes a systematic look at dimensionality in the roll call voting record in the House of Representatives from 1953-2002. This long time horizon allows for a comparison of dimensionality between an era when

congressional observers agreed that Civil Rights provided an extra dimension of preferences and the modern polarized era. The data show that cultural and regional issues like agricultural policy, gun rights, the environment, and abortion display dimensional patterns similar to civil rights issues. A change in the nature of procedural issue voting is also discovered, which suggests strategic behavior on some, but not all, of these dimensional issues.

Chapter Three expands on the findings from Chapter Two and investigates environmental and immigration policy voting in the Senate from the perspective of single votes, rather than the entirety of the roll call record. While some votes may be best explained by partisan or ideological competition, others display evidence of constituency representation of either culture or economic interests. On votes like biodiesel subsidies, ideology takes a back seat to state industries and interest group behavior. For immigration voting, senators from traditionalistic states or with smaller Latino or foreign-born populations are shown to be more likely to cast anti-immigrant roll call votes. This chapter shows how a policy-centered approach often produces a more nuanced view of representation than looking at the entirety of the voting record.

Chapter Four explores the impact of multiple constituencies on voting behavior in the House of Representatives. Utilizing the 2006 *Congressional Election Study* (Stone 2010), this chapter examines the influence of primary voter

ideological extremism on environmental voting behavior. For Republican representatives, a very conservative primary constituency may mean few or no environmentally friendly votes, whereas for Democrats the primary voters had a slight but not statistically significant impact on environmental voting. But when compared with the general election constituency, the opposite finding was true. Democrats' environmental scores, as judged by the (LCV) of Conservation Voters, varied significantly in relation to the average presidential voteshare, while Republicans did not. This finding speaks to the issues representatives face when dealing with multiple principals. Primary constituencies may suppress the role for an environmental dimension to voting, furthering the appearance of an entirely unidimensional structure.

Chapter Five provides an investigation into abortion policy voting in the Senate. If, as the previous chapters propose, the combination of 1) multiple principals and 2) geographic economic or cultural bases for representation provide a mechanism that leads MCs to consider dimensions of preferences beyond the traditional liberal-conservative scale, issues like abortion may be particularly difficult. In this chapter traditionalistic states, median party support, and issue advocates (measured by abortion protest activity) are shown to relate to the likelihood of anti-abortion policy voting. But, a detailed look at policy proposals and floor speeches on these amendments reveal symbolic action,

rather than substantive legislative activity. Often, these acts of political theatre are aimed at these same “subconstituencies.”

The final chapter provides a conclusion and epilogue to the various analyses presented here. In considering the 2014 Agriculture Act, or “Farm Bill,” this chapter explores the future of issue voting and its relationship to both gridlock and the congressional agenda. Using the idea of “heresthetics” (Riker 1984) this chapter explains how dimensionality should continue to decline as a feature of the roll call record yet will always be an important aspect of congressional representation and the roll call record.

The Persistence of Dimensionality in the Congressional Agenda¹

During consideration of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the landmark health care legislation of Obama's first term, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) encountered a roadblock. Speaker Pelosi needed to 218 votes out of her 255 member Democratic caucus to pass the legislation. Standing in the Speaker's path was a group of 40 dissident Democratic members who banded together to oppose consideration of the bill due to a possible loophole in the legislation that could funnel taxpayer money to provide abortions (MacGillis 2009). With only 215 Democratic votes, the bill could not proceed. The Speaker was forced to consider three separate amendments by Democratic members who offered compromises on the question of abortion funding. Rep. Brad Ellsworth (D-IN), a recipient of the lowest possible rating from Planned Parenthood Action Fund for support of reproductive issues, offered one proposal that allowed private contractors to process abortion claims and prohibit health care exchanges from restricting access to plans covering the procedure. Rep. Lois Capps (D-CA), a staunch pro-choice activist, proposed removing all abortion language from the reform plan to prevent any growth or reduction in abortion coverage.

Congressman Bart Stupak (D-MI) and Congressman Joseph Pitts (R-PA) proposed the most restrictive proposed amendment on access and funding possibilities for abortions. After negotiations, and despite more “liberal” amendments being proposed, Speaker Pelosi was forced to allow consideration of a slightly modified Stupak-Pitts amendment. It passed with 64 Democratic yeas and became part of the House version of the legislation.

Issues votes like those on the Stupak-Pitts amendment provide an important challenge to those scholars who focus on a unidimensional model of congressional politics. Some Democrats voting for this amendment had ideological scores more liberal than that of President Obama. For example, two of those liberal supporters were committee chairmen Dave Obey (D-WI) of Appropriations and Jim Oberstar (D-WI) of Transportation and Infrastructure. These liberal, pro-life Democrats from the upper Midwest pushed for changes to the bill on the question of abortion, yet were strong sponsors of the goal of the legislation. The actions of Rep. Stupak and the pro-life Democrats who forced a vote on abortion funding in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act tell an important story about the role of issues outside of the traditional liberal-to-conservative spectrum. In a *Washington Post* op-ed Congressman Stupak explained: “I and other pro-life Democrats are pleased that we were able to hold true to our principles and vote for a bill that is pro-life at every stage of life, and

that provides 32 million Americans with access to high quality, affordable health care” (Stupak 2010). The preferences of these Democrats had two distinct components: a traditional liberal to conservative dimension on the role of government in assuring access to health care, and a second dimension on the issue of abortion.

Theories of party government argue that parties will use the amendment process to move the ideological character of the bill to the party median, rather than the chamber median (Cox and McCubbins 2005). In the case of abortion in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the most conservative amendment was the only one considered on the floor, and was supported in the roll call by only 27% of the Democratic Caucus. Members of the party leadership like Appropriations Chairman Obey abandoned the goals of President Obama and Speaker Pelosi and supported a different policy on the question of abortion, showing how salient issue dimensions can rise above party loyalty and traditional ideology. In this chapter, I explore evidence of the importance of the ideology beyond the first dimension on roll call voting in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Evaluating Dimensionality

This research will use data from the Public Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) database (Rhode 2004), combined with Poole and Rosenthal’s DW -NOMINATE

roll call data (Carroll et al 2011) to examine issue areas in the 83rd to the 95th Congress and the 96th to the 107th Congress. The 95th Congress (1977-78) was chosen as a dividing line for a number of reasons. Poole and Rosenthal argue that the 95th Congress was an example of a unidimensional Congress with the largest number of roll-call votes, further they argue that “from the late 1970s onward, roll call voting again became largely a matter of positioning on a single liberal/conservative” dimension (1997, 5). Other congressional scholars have described this period in Congress as “between legislative eras” (Loomis 1990, 15). Dividing the dataset equally also fits Clausen’s argument about the long time horizon of salient policy domains. The roll call votes in this database are limited compared to the universe of roll-call votes in this period, as unanimous votes were not scaled in the DW-NOMINATE procedure and were dropped from analysis.

The dependent variable considered is the absolute value of the cutting line created in a two dimensional space to classify voting on the roll call. This procedure produces a line that correctly classifies a mean of 86% of votes in the pre-96th Congress, and 89% of votes in the post-96th Congress. The cut line produced is an angle separating the yeas and nays in the space, and the resulting angle can explain much about the dimensionality of the vote. Consider a vote with a 90-degree cutting angle; its vertical position means that the horizontal, liberal-conservative ideology is the important dimension in classifying votes.

Alternatively, consider a horizontal line with slope of zero degrees, running parallel or on top of the traditional first dimension. This cutting angle would exclusively use the second dimension to classify votes. Using this observation, the “steepness” of the cutting line explains how much leverage the second dimension has at classifying votes. The absolute value of the cutting line measures the steepness of each cutting angle as it removes the impact of negative or positively sloped cutting angles.

Issue Areas and Independent Variables

This research tests Clausen’s theory of policy context decision rule by examining how different policy areas affect the steepness of the cutting line produced by the D-W NOMINATE classification scheme. Beyond original issues considered by Clausen, additional areas are added to this analysis that reflect the categorization component of Clausen’s theory. Issue area codes for gun control and abortion are often seen as areas of independence for Republicans and Democrats alike, and they provide areas for position taking to reach primary or “prospective” constituencies (Fenno 1978, Bishin 2000).

Rural Development and Agriculture: These areas have been cited as the source of the extra dimensional preferences in many Congresses (Poole and Daniels 1985; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Hurwitz et al (2001) found that agriculture and rural space is multi-dimensional, even within legislation. Hansen (1991) found

significant impacts for the farm lobby on Congress in his research. Additionally, these areas could capture regional and constituent concerns. Rural development is a classification of appropriations voting, whereas the variable for agriculture includes subsidies and price supports, food stamps, farm credit and other non-appropriations related agriculture bills. As a regional influence, these issues should decrease the steepness of the cutting lines.

Energy and Environment: Similar to the regional nature of rural voting, Talbert and Potoski (2002) find an environmental dimension to congressional voting. Additionally, issues in this policy area could have constituent, regional, or interest group influences. This category includes votes on oil exploration, energy subsidies, pollution, National Parks, and vehicle emissions among others. These votes are hypothesized to decrease steepness of the cutting line as regional or district economic concerns drive voting, rather than a liberal to conservative ideology.

Foreign Policy: International involvement was one of Clausen's examples of a distinct policy domain (1973). Other researchers have found foreign policy to be an important dimension of congressional decision-making (Talbert and Potoski 2002; Crespin and Rhode 2010). Alternatively, Poole and Daniels found foreign policy was best captured by the first dimension (1985). Following the theory of Elazar (1994), and considering the uneven displacement of military facilities,

varying regional and member perspectives on foreign involvement should lead to a negative coefficient.

Abortion: The political culture of regions can influence attitudes towards issue of family planning and abortion (Elazar 1994). This could be varying religious traditions of each region leading to “traditionalistic” political cultures. Norton (1999) also argues that gender issues produce dimensionality. Finally, abortion politics may be salient to many primary constituencies. Based on these theories, votes in this category should hypothetically decrease the steepness of the cutting angle showing a negative coefficient. Absent an ideal measure, I use roll call votes within the health and human services category that include the classifications of “family planning” and “abortion.”

Crime and Criminal Justice: Civil liberties made Clausen’s list of distinct issue areas, and this category of votes in the PIPC classification model fits most closely with the civil liberties arena outline by Clausen. This includes votes on pornography, drug control, criminal procedure, law enforcement assistance and others. Like the abortion vote variable, this category includes many social issues that have been found to be part of the second dimension content.

Gun Control: Gun control is also included in the crime and criminal justice category, but an additional variable controls for it. Preferences on gun rights legislation would theoretically be difficult to classify on a liberal-conservative

scale under traditional definitions. Additionally, gun rights voters may be a significant component of a “prospective” constituency as outlined by Bishin (2000). Gun control issues may divide parties as well as urban and rural legislators; they should affect the cutting angle.

Civil Rights: Poole and Rosenthal find that civil rights was the main issue making up the second dimension in the House for the 81st, 86th, 87th, 90th, 92nd, 94th, 96th, and 97th Congresses (1997, 51). Classification success should increase for civil rights issues if they are captured by the second dimension. In the PIPC conception, this includes pay equity, age discrimination, gay rights, busing, as well the historical components usually classified as “civil rights” issues. Including this variable in the model also helps test for model robustness. If civil rights is a key, if not the only, component of the second dimension for a significant era in congressional history, there should be a large effect for civil rights legislation on the angle of the cutting line.

Party and Control Variables: Three additional variables were added to the models. First, a variable for which legislative session the vote is taken in is included. Members may vote differently on policy areas that could impact their electoral chances, especially as the election approaches. Second, dummy variables were added to note whether a roll call was on final passage or on an amendment vote. We should expect a more active second dimension on

amendment voting because such votes often split parties thus, they reduce the impact of a unidimensional classification structure.

Baseline and Other Issues: The issues areas used as independent variables were selected as theoretically viable second dimension issues. These issues will be considered in opposition to a baseline category of votes not represented by these policy areas. The baseline category includes issues that fit a “liberal” and “conservative” issue dimension properly. These categories include votes on issues like tax policy, national defense contracting, financial service regulation, welfare, Social Security, labor relations, and public broadcasting. A full coding scheme is found in Appendix One.

Results and Discussion

The results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models can be found in Table 2.1. The data show modest support for issue-based dimensionality in voting behavior in Congress during the two eras. Poole and Rosenthal cited civil rights as the issue captured by the second dimension during much of the period of votes pooled to make the pre-96th model. Per that finding, the cutting angle for civil rights issues was about 14 degrees less steep than a typical issue with a low standard error of a less than 2 degrees. This result is helpful to confirm the model design.

Other issue variables in the pre-96th Congress show that roll call voting on rural, agriculture, foreign policy, gun rights, and environmental policies had a statistically significant reduction in the steepness, and therefore the unidimensional structure of the votes. Roll call votes on amendments also showed significant effects on the cutting line, but only by a few degrees.

The post-96th Congress models found results similar to the model for the previous era. Rural development, agriculture, gun rights, and energy issues all reduced the steepness of the cutting line, in line with the previous period. The magnitude of the effect varied in some cases, as rural issues' effect on steepness lessened in the post-96th model. Perhaps the most interesting change was the lack of significance for civil rights issues, which were replaced by the impact of abortion issues, which became the second highest coefficient next to gun rights issues. There were positive and significant coefficients for crime/criminal justice issues, and final passage votes, suggesting these votes were more unidimensional than the others considered.

The variable for the session of the roll call was significant and negative. Roll calls that took place in the second session of a Congress, on average, were less clearly classified by the unidimensional structure. This provides some support for an electoral focus for both individual MCs and parties. As the biennial election nears, members of Congress are more likely to depart from their

first dimension ideological preferences. If the first dimension captures party loyalty (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 35), this result may indicate that individual concerns may trump party loyalty as the election looms.


Table 2.1: Regression of the Absolute Value of the Cutting Line Angle

	Pre-96 th Congress	Post-96 th Congress
(Intercept)	64.295*	66.618*
	(0.878)	(0.578)
Session	-1.939*	-0.823*
	(0.494)	(0.346)
Rural	-16.109*	-7.028*
	(2.419)	(1.266)
Agriculture	-18.564*	-12.931*
	(1.280)	(1.431)
Foreign Policy	-6.298	0.835
	(0.938)	(0.693)
Abortion	2.476	-18.137*
	(7.972)	(2.037)
Energy and Environment	-4.107*	-3.405*
	(0.791)	(0.677)
Gun Control	-22.007*	-23.473*
	(8.287)	(0.265)
Crime and Justice	2.307	3.366*
	(2.228)	(1.153)
Civil Rights	-14.295*	0.757
	(1.465)	(1.571)
Amendment	-2.567*	-2.701
	(0.652)	(0.396)
Final Passage	-0.432	0.778*
	(0.608)	(0.332)
N	6320	12127

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = $p \leq 0.05$

Figure 2.1 graphically demonstrates the changes between issue areas and party control between the pre and post-96th Congress. The Zelig program (Kosuke, King and Lau 2007) was used to conduct a 10,000-vote simulation based on the models specified in Table 2.1; these graphs show the expected cut line of simulated votes in each issue area with a 95% confidence interval. The horizontal

**Figure 2.1: Simulated Absolute Value of Final Passage Vote Cut Line by Issue Area:
Pre and Post 96th Congress**



line shown is the median of the absolute cut line in each period. This line can be used for comparison to the average roll call vote. As is evident on the graph, there were very few roll call votes on abortion and gun rights issues in the pre-96th Congresses, so the confidence interval shown is very large. The most striking

evidence from the figure is the change in the status of civil rights issues, and the rise of abortion issues on the second dimension.

Statistical spatial modeling of roll call votes can produce a one-dimensional ideology that allows for correct classification of a high percentage of votes. But the models presented here show that there is systematic underperformance in that approach when considering specific issue voting. These areas of underperformance are not fatal to the utility of ideology scores or the unidimensional model. In fact, these may actually help to illuminate features of congressional voting behavior and explain what is left unexplained from the unidimensional model.

The Modern Congress and the Second Dimension

The evidence presented in the previous section provides support that issue areas have had a systematic correlation with the performance of the unidimensional model in the modern Congress. The models investigated previously cover 10,241 votes from 24 different congressional sessions, precluding the nuanced analysis required to judge the impact of these specific issue focuses in congressional voting. Looking at each Congress in the data set individually provides opportunities to see when these issues matter, and what effect they may have on dimensionality.

Clausen found stability for his issue dimensions over time, arguing that MCs maintained a consistent categorization of these issues in their decisions, but not that these issue categorizations maintained importance in each Congress. In one chapter, he explores the importance of each of the issue categories on voting in the 91st Congress and finds that only 4 of the 5 issue dimensions are operating (1973, 77). The results presented in Table 1 show that issue dimensions, most of which Clausen used in his original analysis, have continued to be significant beyond his period of study. That is not to say that they have been important in every Congress but rather that there is evidence for the consistency of these issue dimensions over time.

To examine the importance of these issue areas within each Congress, subsets of data were created for individual Congresses in the post-96th era. Data again were combined from the same sources (Rhode 2004, Carroll et al. 2011). The dependent variable is again the steepness of the cutting line created in DW-NOMINATE process as measured in the degrees. The number of scaled votes that were included in analysis varied from 518 in the 107th Congress to 1176 in the 104th. The results of these models are in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.

The models were specified to include every dichotomous variable for issue areas included previously, but in some Congresses these issues were not featured on any roll call vote as coded by the PIPC project (Rhode 2004). Where

no results are displayed, as with gun control issues in the 96-98th Congress, this is the result of no observations, not absence from the model. In the following analyses, each issue area will be considered individually.

Rural Development: Rural development was a significant variable at lowering the steepness of the cutting angle in both periods examined previously. The results presented in these tables demonstrate that it has been an important issue area on the second dimension, but only for specific Congresses. Each significant coefficient for rural issues (103-105th, 107th Congresses) was in double digits, reaching a peak of an average 30 degree effect in the 104th Congress. But the intercept in the 104th Congress is 82, suggesting that most of the roll call votes in this session were more unidimensional.

Agriculture: Agricultural assistance had statistical significance and high magnitude coefficients in a majority of the specific Congresses examined. When pooled, agriculture issues were associated with an on average reduction of 13 degrees in the cutting line, yet in the 107th Congress the coefficient was over twice that estimate. For the 107th Congress, agriculture votes had an, on average, a change of 150% the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Looking at the error terms in the tables, the cases where the agriculture variable was not statistically significant may have been due to lack of observations.

**Table 2.2: Regression of the Absolute Value of the Cutting Line Angle
by Congress (96th to 101st)**

	96 th 1979-80	97 th 1981-82	98 th 1983-84	99 th 1985-86	100 th 1987-88	101 st 1989-90
Intercept	67.013* (2.449)	44.088* (3.445)	49.838* (2.858)	55.203* (2.264)	59.148* (2.281)	56.530 (2.356)
Session	-3.871* (1.331)	1.771 (1.906)	0.080 (1.720)	3.299* (1.334)	-0.994 (1.352)	1.409 (1.364)
Rural	9.343 (8.665)	13.086 (7.716)	13.397 (7.992)	-2.014 (5.553)	-8.164 (10.379)	3.445 (7.353)
Agriculture	2.066 (4.009)	-14.687* (5.070)	5.990 (4.681)	-2.611 (3.450)	5.302 (5.454)	-20.990* (3.950)
Foreign Policy	2.877 (2.153)	-2.590 (4.092)	1.112 (2.979)	1.119 (2.026)	3.005 (2.355)	0.361 (2.304)
Abortion	-8.419 (14.937)			-10.911 (18.223)		
Energy & Environment	-2.280 (2.160)	-1.532 (3.772)	-2.282 (3.075)	-7.145* (3.304)	-3.273 (2.547)	1.059 (2.443)
Crime	1.959 (5.065)	25.458 (17.133)	9.183 (6.968)	2.388 (5.152)	0.407 (3.331)	0.640 (3.850)
Civil Rights	1.022 (4.894)	7.274 (8.158)	4.608 (6.953)	4.755 (5.314)	8.415 (4.350)	8.347* (3.988)
Gun Control				-18.749* (8.520)	-28.031 (18.160)	-14.698 (13.160)
Amendment	-1.446 (1.656)	8.157* (2.260)	11.033* (2.054)	3.632* (1.517)	7.309* (1.538)	4.512* (1.555)
Final Passage	1.432 (1.709)	17.999* (2.351)	17.700 (2.179)	8.336* (1.750)	9.247* (1.691)	8.265* (1.674)
N	1067	679	792	777	771	752

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = $p \leq 0.05$.

Foreign Policy: The model presented in Table 2.1 show some influence for foreign policy issues on the cutting angle, yet it was low in magnitude. The coefficient showed only a one-fifth change in the standard deviation of the dependent variable. When looking at each Congress individually, presented in

Table 2.3: Regression of the Absolute Value of the Cutting Line Angle
by Congress (102nd to 107th)

	102 nd 1991-92	103 rd 1993-94	104 th 1995-96	105 th 1997-98	106 th 1999-00	107 th 2000-01
Intercept	61.923* (2.309)	63.549* (1.921)	82.014* (1.702)	69.852* (1.958)	64.472* (2.182)	65.605 (2.660)
Session	0.579 (1.289)	-0.032 (1.177)	-5.769* (1.117)	-0.509 (1.204)	1.014 (1.261)	0.193 (1.654)
Rural	-10.293 (5.568)	11.264* (4.207)	-29.875* (3.516)	-16.209* (3.216)	-3.435 (3.105)	-14.033* (5.384)
Agriculture	-20.672* (10.063)	-22.235* (10.219)	-22.132* (5.076)	4.083 (8.109)	-26.271* (6.787)	-27.775* (4.914)
Foreign Policy	1.886 (2.625)	1.329 (3.353)	1.931 (2.324)	1.790 (2.296)	-3.143 (3.943)	-0.706 (2.979)
Abortion	-14.140* (6.187)	-8.403* (3.522)	-28.832* (6.567)	-25.496* (5.077)	-22.997* (6.747)	-31.023* (8.765)
Energy & Environment	-0.293 (2.339)	-2.290 (2.141)	-9.280* (2.157)	-9.775* (2.596)	-1.087 (2.401)	-12.393* (3.913)
Crime	9.223* (4.352)	7.611* (2.567)	4.570 (2.989)	11.107* (3.917)	-13.823 (3.962)	17.893 (17.525)
Civil Rights	7.454 (4.697)		-2.699 (7.082)	-23.242 (18.055)	-8.295 (6.341)	3.287 (12.357)
Gun Control	-19.366* (7.810)	-26.813* (7.629)	-41.469* (12.598)		-10.023 (5.551)	
Amendment	-0.560 (1.501)	0.220 (1.289)	-11.703* (1.144)	-7.900* (1.377)	-5.246* (1.429)	-1.424 (1.805)
Final Passage	3.749 (1.594)	5.901* (1.591)	-3.414* (1.513)	-2.485 (1.596)	2.165 (1.587)	2.742 (2.018)
N	780	969	1176	946	874	518

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = $p \leq 0.05$

Tables 2.2 and 2.3, these results seem to vanish. In no Congress was this issue area shown to affect the dimensionality of the vote.

Abortion: The most interesting results presented in this model show the rise of abortion as a dimensional issue in Congress. The 96th-101st Congress show nearly no votes on abortion issues; in most cases they were dropped as a variable because no votes were classified in this issue area. From the 102nd -107th Congress roll call votes on abortion had a consistently flatter cutting angle than the other

issues considered. In the modern period abortion issues have not been unidimensional, but rather have the largest influence for the second dimension of the issues considered.

Energy and Environment: Energy and environmental issues were sporadic in their impact on the dimensionality of roll call votes, only having significant effects in four of the twelve Congresses modeled. When they were significant, their coefficients were less than half that of other issue areas in the model.

Crime: In all of the models, only four variables showed positive and significant effects on the steepness of the cutting line. Three of these cases were in the crime and criminal justice variable. Though the magnitude was less than other variables, this data suggests that votes on crime and criminal justice are explained by liberal to conservative ideology better than other issue areas.

Civil Rights: The results in Table 2.1 showed that civil rights had not been an issue area with any leverage on the cutting angles of votes in the post-96th Congress. In only one Congress did the issue have a significant effect (p-value=0.036). Given this data, it appears the civil rights dimension of voting in Congress has largely vanished to the extent that such votes are largely expressed on the first dimension.

Gun Control: The largest coefficient in the post-96th Congress model in Table 2.1 was found in the issue variable for gun policy. When we look at the level of each


Congress, we see that this reflected the impact of a few years of congressional work. In the 104th Congress the coefficient doubles the standard deviation of the dependent variable, representing the largest impact of the variables in the models in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. In the following 105th Congress there are no recorded votes coded as gun control issues, 21 votes in 106th, and no votes again in the 107th Congress. Within some years where gun control is on the agenda, we see the impact of dimensionality. But for many years, these issues are not on the agenda and therefore may produce a roll call record appears more unidimensional than the actual preferences of the members.

Dimensionality in the “Contract with America”

The evidence provided in the models in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 shows the changing dimensionality and coalitions of MCs on issue areas over time. As the data for gun control votes demonstrated, issues can emerge and disappear on the agenda and become a dominant feature of the agenda. It is useful to consider what this looks like within a Congress. Figure 2.2 shows these data graphically and provides the results of a 10,000 vote simulation based on the regression model for the 104th Congress (Kosuke, King and Lau 2007). The 104th Congress, the first term of Speaker Newt Gingrich and that of the “Contract with America,” was chosen because it has the highest number of cases, highest r^2 in relation to explaining the changes in the cutting line angles, and largest initial intercept of

82, meaning a mainly unidimensional Congress. A horizontal line was placed at the median cutting line of 72.15, the mean was 66, with a standard deviation of 19.2. The bars in each issue area represent the 95% confidence intervals for each issue area. This figure can be compared with Figure 2.1, which displayed the simulation results for the pre and post 96th Congress. The low number of roll calls on many of the issue areas preclude an over focus on the results of this simulation. But the maximum 95% confidence interval for votes on rural development and abortion issues is one standard deviation “flatter” from the mean cutting line.

**Figure 2.2 : Simulated Absolute Value of Amendment Vote Cutting Angle by Issue Area:
104th Congress (1995-96)**



Agenda Setting and Dimensionality

The literature on agenda setting provides theories as to why we should expect certain issues to become salient in any given time period. As with Clausen's "law of categorization" these ideas are drawn from decision-making theories in psychology. Some individuals may pride themselves as multi-taskers, but cognitive processing is generally categorized by selective information and "bottlenecks" of attention (Baumgartner and Jones 2002, 16). This dynamic can also be described as serial, rather than parallel, processing where attention to issues is focused on a case by case, rather than multiple cases at once. For individuals, this is one way rational behavior is "bounded" or limited. While a useful model of individual and institutional behavior, bounded rationality should also allow for congressional capacities to consider multiple issues (for instance: Baumgartner and Gold 2002, 280-281). It may be more useful to think of serial processing in terms of attention levels in the institution, rather than in the individual level work. The issues on the second dimension historically were often the most salient issues of the time, and as such were a central focus of institutional attention.

Slavery, the coinage of silver, and civil rights have had their place on the congressional agenda, and will not be the subject of another congressional vote. Issues routinely hit the public agenda and then disappear. New agenda issues in

which parties have do not have a consistent positions create the possibility for specific issue dimensions to rise on the agenda. Rural issues, abortion, and gun control votes were almost nonexistent in Table 2.2, but they became some of the most significant contributors to the dimensionality of voting from 102nd-107th Congress.

The logic of Clausen's law of categorization lies in the fact that legislators have general characterizations of issues that can be used to guide their decision making on specific roll call votes. It is likely that positions on gun control and abortion of legislators have not changed, but the agenda did. As issue dimensions become relevant, or disappear as the case may be, the importance of issue areas or a second dimension may change. As the models from the Reagan era (97-100th) show, issue areas played no role in affecting dimensionality.

Clausen, writing about the disappearance of dimensions explained:

[W]e may find that some of the five dimensions are currently viable whereas others have disappeared... In the latter instance, it is anticipated that the new dimensions will have emerged in place of the old. But this is no cause for anxiety, rather, it is a reason for excitement, as the dynamics of change have potential for exposing the conditions that produce new policy dimensions and the demise of old. (1973, 58)

The analysis presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate, some concrete examples of issue dimensions become part of the congressional agenda and affect the usual liberal-to-conservative separation of voting behavior. The data show the rise and subsequent disappearance of gun control during the period studied, the relative unidimensionality of the Reagan era, and the introduction of

abortion voting on the agenda. These cases present important examples of the dynamic nature of issue attention and dimensionality. Comparing Figures 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrates that individual issue areas do not seem to have a large effect in terms of magnitude on dimensionality in a given era, but in a specific Congress we could expect the average cutting line to be below 45 degrees. The apparent dominance of the liberal-to-conservative dimension is lessened when examining specific issue areas in a concise time period.

Dimensionality in the Legislative Process

The previous sections have documented how second dimension issue preferences can affect roll call voting. In the first section, issue areas consistently affect the importance of the second dimension on roll call votes across legislative eras. The models presented also provide evidence for the disappearance of the civil rights issue dimension and the rise of the abortion dimension. This result informed the second section, which focused on the role these dimensions can play in a shorter time periods by examining specific congresses. The issue areas described by Clausen nearly 40 years ago are still important dimensions in roll call votes. Agriculture and rural development issues have had significant effects, both statistically and in magnitude, on the relevance of the second dimension on roll call voting. While issues may not always be agenda items in a given Congress, the significance of Clausen's law of categorization seems to hold.

These results point to a third important question, where in the process are these votes occurring?

Some evidence for the nature of these votes can be found in the preceding analysis. In Table 2.2, we see the coefficient for final passage and amendment voting consistently significant and in the positive direction. But as the 104th Congress emerges in Table 2.3, we see the coefficients flip signs in the cases they are significant. In the earlier period, amendments and final passage roll calls were associated with a stronger first ideological dimension. In cases like the 98th and 100th Congress, these were the only variables found to be significant. Amendments that were the subject of roll call votes during the 104th-106th Congress were correlated with stronger second dimension of preferences, on average.

Cox and McCubbin's (2005) cartel theory of party government asserts that parties should avoid bringing any issues to the floor that might produce intra-party conflict. Successful party leadership, in the pure form of this theory, will result in unidimensional policy structured around the majority median legislator with consistent minority party losses. The gatekeeping power of committees exercised by the majority party may lower the unidimensional structure of voting (Snyder 1992), and that, during periods of strong majority parties' agenda setting powers push back latent dimensionality (Dougherty et al 2014). For cartel

theorists, an effective vote would have a 90 degree cut line, running perpendicular to the first ideological dimension. From this perspective, it should be surprising that the House of Representatives, with rules on debate and amendments, should see extra dimensionality at all.

Some party splitting votes may be good for the majority party. We could expect members to be given the freedom to break with parties on specific issues for electoral reasons (Mayhew 1974). The wide variation in the culture and ideology of the individual constituencies might necessitate party leaders allowing members opportunities for “position taking” (Fenno 1978, Elazar 1994). A majority party relies on maintaining its membership beyond the current session. Theoretical reasons may explain second dimension voting even if we remove the assumption of party influence. Roll calls poorly explained by a single dimension may just be a necessary consequence of legislators expressing preferences and moving the bill to the floor median or “pivotal” ideological point to ensure passage (Black 1948, Krehbiel 1998).

A subset of votes in the Clinton era (103-106th Congresses) was created from the original dataset used in the preceding sections to study the effect of the vote type and issue areas on the dimensionality of votes. An OLS regression model using the absolute value of the cut line is used here as it was in the previous section. A dichotomous variable was created to code the type of vote.

Votes on procedures were coded 1 and non-procedural votes were coded 0.

Using the PIPC dataset used previously (Rhode 2004, Carroll et al 2011), non-procedural votes include the content of the final passage and amendment variables used previously as well as votes on veto overrides and the final passage of resolutions. The dichotomous variable for procedure was interacted with the significant variables for the period as displayed in Table 3: gun rights, agriculture, abortion, rural development and energy environment. The results of this model are presented in Table 2.4.

**Table 2.4: Regression of the Absolute Value of the Cutting Line Angle:
Clinton Era (1993-2000)**

(Intercept)	64.984*
	(0.381)
Procedural Vote	3.117*
	(0.641)
Gun Control	-26.855*
	(4.276)
Agriculture	-26.832*
	(3.871)
Abortion	-17.652*
	(3.961)
Energy & Environment	-6.812*
	(1.274)
Procedural * Gun Control	2.156
	(7.155)
Procedural * Agriculture	35.821*
	(8.975)
Procedural * Abortion	0.100
	(5.115)
Procedural * Rural	21.554*
	(3.956)
Procedural * Energy & Environment	10.131*
	(3.051)
N	3965

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = $p \leq 0.05$

The results in Table 2.4 are striking. The interactive variables show a complete reversal of the coefficients for the individual issue dimension codes. In every case, the coefficient for the interactive variable was higher than the individual issue code. When the vote on an issue deals with a procedural item, the second dimension's importance was reversed. There were 3965 votes in the Clinton presidency used in this analysis, of which 1346 were procedural. Importantly, 333 were on the passage of special rules, and of the 170 were motions on the previous question 143 involved the passage of special rules. The importance of the structure of these rules, and the ability for negative agenda control by parties through these rules, has been demonstrated in previously (Oleszek 2007). Given this data, partisan and therefore ideological voting may be more about procedure than substance.

Perhaps more intriguing are the results for gun rights and abortion issues on procedural votes. Contrary to the way the rest of the variables perform, there was no significant influence for these issue dimensions in procedural votes. There are some interesting theoretical explanations for this result. Groups like the National Rifle Association and the Brady Campaign on gun control issues, and National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) and National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) create legislative profiles for MCs on issues based on roll call votes (Roberts and Bell 2008). These votes are often on final passage and

amendment votes, but procedural motions are used for issues where roll calls were not taken. Two of the eight votes for NARAL in 2011 were procedural motions, as were two of 10 NRLC's votes. Position taking may be a crucial incentive for members of Congress when votes concern issues important to the primary or prospective constituency (Fenno 1978, Bishin 2000).

Is it possible the results presented in Table 2.4 are due to the partisanship that marked the Clinton presidency? When parties are strong at controlling the floor agenda, voting on procedural issues should in theory be more unidimensional and party based, even if the second dimension affects issue activity. To test this idea, an OLS model was created to see if the interactive effect of procedural votes in issue areas was consistent. This model used the dataset from the first model in Table 2.1, the pre 96th Congress model (1953-1980). The consistent dimensionality of rural and agriculture issues across these periods allowed for comparison; additionally, the disappearance of votes coded as civil rights and the rise of abortion roll call votes allowed for testing of a salient social category in each period. The results are presented in Table 2.5 below.

While procedure votes are associated with a minimal increase in the steepness of the cut line, the results for the pre-96th Congress are much different than the Clinton presidency. A few hypotheses for this result should be considered. It is possible that the kind of interest group activity discussed

previously is at work here as well (see Hansen 1991). It could also be a result of a change in procedural norms and strategies. The special rule seems a likely suspect, but the pre-96th universe of votes includes 344 votes on special rules out of 1623 procedural votes (21.1%) compared to 333 special rule votes of 1346 procedure roll calls (24.7%) in the Clinton presidency. A final hypothesis is that general party systems or eras are responsible for this dynamic. Perhaps the

**Table 2.5: Regression of the Absolute Value of the Cutting Line Angle:
Pre 96th Congress and Clinton Era**

	Pre-96 th Congress	Clinton Era
(Intercept)	59.098* (0.298)	64.186* (0.366)
Procedural Vote	1.498* (0.593)	3.836* (0.628)
Rural	-14.607* (2.796)	-20.607* (2.049)
Agriculture	16.355* (1.487)	-26.034* (3.909)
Civil Rights	-11.846* (1.865)	
Abortion		16.854* (4.001)
Procedural * Rural	-2.066 (5.677)	20.835* (3.994)
Procedural * Agriculture	-3.933 (2.934)	35.103* (9.067)
Procedural * Civil Rights	-4.208 (3.030)	
Procedural * Abortion		-0.618 (5.165)
N	6320	3965

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = $p \leq 0.05$

“Conservative Coalition” years in the House procedure votes were affected by two dimensions, while Congress in the partisan “Contract with America” era of impeachment the first dimension of party ideology was dominant. In any of

these cases, the effect of the type of vote on the dimensionality of the vote warrants further research.

Conclusion: The Role and Importance of Issues on the Second Dimension?

Second dimension issues have been critically important in American history, and the persistence of intra-party division on key political issues into the modern Congress provides support that issues outside the liberal to conservative continuum were not as insignificant as some researchers have claimed. By exploring the dimensionality of roll call voting from a variety of perspectives, a more complex picture emerges the modern polarized Congress. A picture that demonstrates changing coalitions on important issues outside the unidimensional Congress.

In the first section of this chapter two legislative eras were examined to explore the persistence of the extra-dimensional issues, as outlined by Clausen and other theorists. The periods from 1953-1970 (83-96th Congress) and 1981-2008 (97th-110th Congress) both had statistically significant effects for rural development, agriculture assistance and gun rights issues on the dimensionality of the roll call vote. The civil rights issue dimension in the pre-96th Congress seems to have been replaced as the rise of the abortion issue dimension in the post-96th Congress proved to have significant effects. These results show the

continuity of issue dimensions across a wide stretch of congressional history, but also that new issues may rise to significance.

The results of the first part of this analysis showed both the consistency of issues like agriculture and the emergence of new issues. Given the evidence of issue intrusion, I explored how these individual issue areas could affect the dimensionality of roll call voting within specific meetings of Congress. Looking at 12 different Congresses, there is indeed great variability in the importance of each issue over time. In the first six congresses (96th-101st) there were often not even enough roll call votes on abortion to include the variable in the analysis, in the following six congresses it became one of the most significant issue areas affecting the dimensionality of voting. A similar dynamic was true for gun and rural issues. While the evidence for the impact of the second dimension was still seen in this analysis, the influence of the agenda was also apparent.

The final section of this chapter explored whether issue dimensions were evident in procedural votes, or only on roll calls affecting the language of legislation. The evidence here was surprising. When looking at the Clinton-era roll call votes, a vote on an agriculture issue was shown to be associated with an average 26 degree decrease in the absolute value of the cutting angle. Yet when an interactive variable was included to see how procedural votes on agriculture affected the cutting line, the result was an average increase of 35 degrees. The

reversal in the sign of the coefficients was surprising, procedural votes were significantly more unidimensional than votes on amendments and final passage. This could be explained by features of the Clinton era House. The evidence from a comparison model created with the pre-96th Congress data showed less dimensionality as procedural votes did not have a statistically significant effect on the cutting line of votes in the earlier period.

The evidence presented in the models and simulations all confirm the dimensionality of voting in the modern U.S. House, even within the high levels of polarization that have emerged in the past quarter-century. This analysis is only the next step of many in a growing recent literature on the dimensionality in Congress (Crespin and Rhode 2010, Dougherty et al 2014). Many questions are left to be answered, and the results here may provoke more questions than the results answer.

Poole and Rosenthal argue that: “from the late 1970s onward, roll call voting again became largely a matter of positioning on a single liberal-to-conservative dimension (1997, 5).” It cannot be argued that the liberal-to-conservative dimension is unimportant, and the likelihood of another issue matching civil rights as a second dimension component is doubtful. The evidence provided supports challenges to the claim of a strictly unidimensional Congress (Koford 1989, Wilcox and Clausen 1991, Crespin and Rhode 2010). The

aggregation of roll call votes may just create the appearance of a nearly dominant unidimensional structure. Given position-taking motives and the regional interests of a district-based congressional constituency, specific issue areas will continue to conflict with the liberal to conservative ideology of some legislators. But as the story of the Stupak amendment illustrates, issues beyond the traditional unidimensional ideological space are crucial to congressional politics and policymaking.

Regionalism, Culture and Representation: Environmental and Immigration Policy in Congress

Even within a largely unidimensional and increasingly polarized Congress, voting coalitions on environmental and agricultural issues displayed a dimensionality that was markedly different than the average roll call vote. The hypothesis that these votes would not display a unidimensional, vertical cutting angle was based on the geographic nature of constituency economic interests.

There are many examples of MCs who take environmental positions in opposition to their parties' position and personal ideology pigeonhole.

Democrats from the coal and farm belts, and Republicans from the coasts who worry about environmental damage all must balance the conflicting motivations of district or state economic interests and their own thoughts about regulation and the role of government. Immigration issues are analyzed here for similar theoretical reasons as environmental policy. Geographic fragmentation of constituency economic interest may also be important considerations for immigration issue voting. But the United States is marked by a dispersion of political cultures that may also influence a senator's calculus. In the cases of both environmental and immigration policy we can make some claim as to how each

state's Senate delegation will consider these issues on the roll call record, and what that observation can contribute to an understanding of polarization and issue politics. This chapter explores aspects of issue representation by unpacking the role of district economic interest and demographic constituencies. For district economic influences, we examine farm economies and biodiesel subsidies. To examine the role of demographic constituency, we consider the impact of Latino populations English language laws and other immigration related policy.

The analysis in the preceding chapter utilized a very large sample of votes -- the entire house roll call record from 1979-2001. This chapter takes a different approach. Here, the analysis focuses on the U.S. Senate and considers individual roll call votes. A realistic, descriptive view of congressional voting requires examining issues and policies in detail. It is arguably this area that the unidimensional model is most lacking. A NOMINATE score or a personal ideology is a great summary of the scope of roll call voting, but it might well miss much about the influence of constituency interests in a single area.

To better understand these issues I will explore salient issue votes on environmental and immigration policy in the U.S. Senate. The Senate is chosen for two reasons, one practical and one theoretical. First, the individualized Senate (Sinclair 1989) of entrepreneurial operations (Loomis 1990) may create different conditions than the more institutional-centric House of Representatives. An

additional institutional consideration is the availability of outside groups to conduct spending on senatorial races at a much higher level than more localized house races.

Environmental Policy Voting in Congress

Literature on environmental policy combines many subfields of study within American policymaking, and often these separate lines of research operate without much dialog. Venturing into a lively debate among public policy researchers who test these propositions on environmental policy requires considering the literature of these experts. To cover these various approaches, it is first necessary to discuss the literature on parties, grassroots organizing and pressure system. Following this discussion, the focus turns to our focus on voting behavior in Congress.

Scholars have noted the role of grassroots and interest group activism on environmental issues. In a study that tested trends in grassroots activity levels on specific environmental roll call votes in the Senate, a modest relationship was shown for mass behavior and roll call voting decisions (Fowler and Shaiko 1987). Grassroots protest activity is argued to impact specific issues like endangered species legislation and energy tax credit, yet be less important on items like shale oil development and redwood park expansion. The issues that were influenced by grassroots factors were hypothesized to be the result of interest group

synergy on campaigns and where issues were symbolic rather than technical (Fowler and Shaiko, 502). Another line of research suggests that a similar trend in the importance of coordination among interest groups and successful lobbying efforts, but further argues that changes (specifically downward trends) in objective environmental quality helps spur activism and interest group activity (Johnson, Agnon and McCarthy 2010, Johnson and Frickel 2011). Given these findings, grassroots activism should be most likely where: 1) issues are symbolic, rather than technical, 2) multiple interest groups with significant memberships are active, which is more likely when 3) environmental conditions are getting worse.

The economic needs of a state have been shown to be an influence on roll call votes within the Senate. Calling the process a “tragedy of the political commons” Hussain and Laband (2005) found that Senators are sensitive to the costs of regulations and benefits reaped by environmental policies and regulations. Thus, Senators are more likely to pass on costs when their state benefits, and less likely to agree to legislation in which their state pays a cost. This dynamic reflects the state level factors in which MCs operate, and a role for influence beyond ideology.

The large majority of findings tend to favor ideological or party based explanations for voting behavior. Bernstein and Horn (1981) found ideology to

be the most significant influence on House members opposition to oil companies' positions they argued that their "analysis is needed substantively as a counterweight to much of the published material, especially that by energy-policy specialist-which incorrectly attributes congressional voting behavior to constituency pressures (235)." Still, they did see a significant relationship between oil production and MCs' positions. Riddlesperger and King (1982) found that an interactive variable for party and region was most effective at accounting for roll call votes on energy policy in the Senate. Again, region was significant variable. Hird (1983) argued that environmental ideology was of consistent importance, but in the models examined there were significant influences for environmental interests, environmental quality variables, and numerous constituent demographics. In the Fowler and Shaiko (1987) study, ideology and party were significant variables in nearly every model presented, although grassroots and state economic interests variables also showed some interests. The most recent study in this tradition, by Nelson (2002), again finds mixed results. Nelson finds robust influences for ideology, but notes that regional patterns exist to this pattern, and that ideology and partisanship correlate at $r^2 = 0.79$.

These studies all examined roll call voting in Congress on environmental issues with generally consistent results. In all cases party or ideological variables

accounted for most of the roll call voting choices of MCs. Given the nature of party control of the roll call agenda, this should not be surprising (Cox and McCubbins 2005). This previous research also covers two decades, yet the most recent of tests was a decade ago, and using data from years previous to that. If polarization on environmental issues has been increasing since that time, revisiting and reproducing of these types of studies is necessary.

Voting on environmental policy may be one area where the constituency influence and ideological models of legislative choices are most at odds. The environmental movement in America is entering its fifth decade, but questions about the use and abuse of U.S. land, water, and air go much further. Conservation and land management tended to be the main agenda items for MCs before the “Environmental Protection Agency,” “Superfund,” or “Climate Change” became common terms in the American lexicon. Environmental damage has an “excludability” problem where pollution does not stay put within a district. In an era of “new federalism” where Medicaid, education and drug laws have been devolved to the states, environmental regulation may follow. To prevent a state or local based approach, congressional environmental action could be crucial. Part of this collective action dilemma means that costs and benefits of regulation and incentive programs will not be felt equally across states. This may force MCs to consider more fully the economic considerations of

districts rather than other ideological bases of decision-making. As this policy area develops, environmental questions may become a larger part of the public and Congressional agenda, requiring a greater focus on these issues. Testing the influences of ideological and constituency-based influences on Senate roll call votes contributes to a longstanding debate among congressional scholars about the relative importance of each of these factors.

Research Approach

Choosing from the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) key votes for the 111th Senate, I explore the relative factors that may influence environmental voting calculus. The LCV key vote scorecard highlights environmental votes to help pressure MCs by the knowledge that the record will be publicize to the media and to LCV membership. Since MCs are aware that these votes may be used to score their voting behavior, so it provides an opportunity for position taking (Fenno 1978, Roberts and Cohen Bell 2008). Table 3.1 outlines the votes that were in the 2010 scorecard for the Senate.

The independent variables and other controls chosen for these models reflect the designs of the previous studies and their underlying theory. A number of state level variables are included. Two variables for the economic activity of the states are included to reflect the possible motivations and costs to state industry; they include the percent of state industry from agriculture, forestry and

Table 3.1: 2010 League of Conservation Voters Key Vote Summary

Topic	Vote	Summary and Description: Quotes from LCV Scorecard
Border Fence	45-52	Sen. DeMint amendment to HR4899: "Nearly one-third of the 1,950 mile United States-Mexico border lies within military, tribal, and public lands, including wilderness areas, national wildlife refuges, national parks, national forests, national monuments, and state parks. Much of this country's most magnificent and imperiled wildlife -- including jaguars, ocelot, bighorn sheep, Sonoran pronghorn, and hundreds of bird species -- depend upon these public lands for intact habitat." NO is the pro-environmental vote. Roll Call 272
Lead Paint	60-37	Sen. Collins amendment to HR899: "This amendment would not only prohibit the EPA from fining those contractors who had wanted to undergo safety training but were unable to do so through no fault of their own; the amendment could also prohibit the agency from fining those contractors who willfully took no precautions to confine or contain lead-contaminated paint chips, even if it resulted in the lead poisoning of children. NO is the pro-environmental vote. Roll Call 173
Dirty Air Act (SJ Res 26)	47-53	Sen. Murkowski SJ Res 26: "In December 2009, the EPA issued this "endangerment finding," concluding that, based on the best science, global warming pollution presents a clear threat to public health and welfare. The endangerment finding was the scientific determination necessary to allow the agency to start limiting global warming pollution under the Clean Air Act" This resolution would overturn the endangerment finding. NO is the pro-environmental vote. Roll Call 184
Oil Subsidies	35-61	Senator Bernard Sanders (I-VT) amendment: "to eliminate \$35 billion in subsidies to the oil and gas industry, giveaways which were targeted for elimination in the President's budget; \$25 billion of the savings would go to deficit reduction and \$10 billion would be directed to the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program, a grant program that allows communities to invest in projects that reduce energy usage." YES is the pro environmental vote. Roll Call 187
Biodiesel Tax Credit	41-58	Senator Grassley Amendment to HR5297: "A tax credit for biodiesel was created in 2004 as part of the JOBS Act, which provided \$1.00 to the fuel blenders for each gallon of biodiesel blended into petroleum diesel. The credit expired at the end of 2009." This amendment would retroactively extend the tax credit. NO is the pro environmental vote. Roll Call 234
Renewable Energy	43-57	Senator Sanders Amendment to HR4853: "The Sanders amendment would provide critical funding for state and local energy efficiency projects, tax credits for investments in clean energy manufacturing, and loan guarantees for clean energy projects." YES is the pro-environmental vote. Roll Call 275

fishing, and percent from manufacturing (United States Census Bureau 2010). An additional variable for changes in the health of the state economy is included; it measures the change in Gross State Product (GSP) from 2007-2008 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis). Though the GSP variable only measures a snapshot in time, the votes under consideration took place in the session after the 2008 election. So the GSP measure attempts to capture the economic outlook at the time of the previous election. The extent of environmental damage as measured by the number of National Priority List (NPL) final listing sites in each state is included (Environmental Protection Agency 2012). A variable that measures the liberalism of the state's population in 2010 is included to reflect the electoral incentives faced by members of Congress (Berry et al. 1998). The final state-level variable is the population density of the state as measured in population per square mile (U.S. Census Bureau). This was included to measure farming capacity and industrialization, which is a good proxy for regional variables found to be significant in previous studies. Of the top 10 population densities, all are in the industrial Northeast with the exception of Florida with Southern, Midwest, and Northeast states becoming the next most dense respectively.

Each of the state-level variables mentioned previously could also be considered as part of the same unit of analysis, as these state characteristics reflect the electoral base of each senator. But a number of variables that would be

different between Senators of the same state are included. The first variable is a dichotomous measure for membership on the Senate Environment and Public Works committee. This variable is important because it reflects the senator's expertise, interest, and possible involvement with the environmental legislation under consideration. Two variables reflect the interest group support of Senators in the form of campaign contributions from oil and gas interests and environmental group donations. The data collected from the Center for Responsive Politics (2012) only code the top 50 industries contributing to each campaign committee, if the Oil/Gas or Environmental sector was not part of the top 50 sectors contributing, it was coded as 0. With only two exceptions were the total campaign contributions from a sector over \$50,000 total over the period from 2005-2010, in most every case it was much less. Even in the instances where it could have been higher than \$50,000 the fact that 50 different sectors were higher contributors should signal that the sector was not a key source of support for the senator. Finally, a measure of ideology, created using the *DW-NOMINATE* procedure (see Poole and Rosenthal 1997), was included. As mentioned previously, the correlation between this ideology score and party membership was correlated at $r^2=0.94$ and due to multicollinearity issues both measures could not be included. The extra variation of the ideology variable

makes it a preferable measure, given its ability to distinguish between moderate and more extreme members of each party.

Ideological v. Dimensional Voting: Biodiesel and SJ. Res 26

In the models created for each roll call in the 2010 scorecard, two votes stood out as providing representations of the competing ideological and economic motivations for roll call voting behavior. The other models showed variations on these two archetypes of voting decisions. Rather than considering the entire roll call record, as in Chapter Two, here the focus is on specific policy votes. If dimensional forces push MCs to shirk partisan or ideological considerations in significant votes, this poses a challenge to a strict ideological model of voting behavior. Constituency interests can be significant when MCs are given an opportunity to express these preferences. These results of these models are presented in Table 3.2.

The first model is a vote on retroactive extension of the biodiesel tax credit. Biodiesel is a plant or animal-fat-based fuel that can be used by itself or as part of typical petroleum-based diesel to power diesel engines, most often soybeans. Agricultural states that grow soybeans have an interest in production and subsidies of these types of fuels. The results from the first model in Table 3.2 show that this vote fits the economic model of voting behavior. The greater the share of agriculture industry in the state, the more likely yes votes on the issue.

All of the state level economic or descriptive variables are significant, but the ideology of the state citizenry and of the senator is not. Increased contributions from oil interests are shown to decrease the likelihood of support for the biodiesel tax credit, which is unexpected, but could be explained by oil and gas interests attempting to limit the competition soybeans may introduce for gas. In this bill ideological and political positions are not shown to have an influence, but state characteristics and economic interests are correlated with vote choice.

The second model in Table 3.2 is a vote on SJ Res 26, which formally stated congressional opposition to an EPA rule that greenhouse gases fulfill the “endangerment” or “cause and contribute” language of section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act. If implemented it would prohibit the EPA from making regulations against greenhouse gas polluters using the Clean Air Act. Ideology was the only significant variable in this model. These two roll calls provide evidence of both the economic and ideological models of congressional vote choice. In the instance of SJ. Res 26, nearly all of the variance in vote choices could be explained by ideology as measured. Yet the biodiesel tax credit vote shows that economic bases for voting decisions can be important on specific roll calls on critical issues in US environmental policy.

Table 3.2: Logit Models of Vote Choice, Environmental Issues in 111th Senate

	Biodiesel Tax Credit	SJ Res 26: Impact of Greenhouse Gas
(Intercept)	6.134* (2.600)	-1.774 (5.770)
Environmental Committee	0.753 (0.806)	2.471 (2.416)
Percent Change State GSP	-0.368* (-0.148)	0.431 (0.342)
State Citizen Ideology	-0.036 (0.025)	0.021 (0.068)
NOMINATE	0.215 (1.029)	-12.460* (4.603)
Population Density	0.010+ (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)
Percent Industry: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	0.458* (0.228)	-0.178 (0.546)
Percent: Industry Manufacturing	-0.462* (0.133)	-0.341 (0.220)
Environmental Contributions	-0.018 (0.067)	0.046 (0.161)
Oil Contributions	-0.067* (0.029)	-0.105 (0.146)
NPL Sites 2010	0.016 (0.023)	0.080 (0.061)
N	96	97
-2LLR	49.025*	115.009*

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, + = $p \leq 0.1$; * = $p \leq 0.05$.

The results presented here provide confirmation of the previous studies on Congressional voting behavior on environmental issues. Ideology matters, but on certain votes there is evidence of economic-based voting incentives. This

research was far from a perfect test of these two competing models. But it presents a number of possible hypotheses. One possibility is that the nature of the specific policy change considered matters. If we can extrapolate from the case of the Biodiesel and SJ Res 26 votes, it is possible that policy where economic benefits are centralized and costs are spread thin, as with Biodiesel subsidies, economic based voting behavior may be the dominant model. Alternatively, where costs are centralized and benefits are dispersed thinly, as with greenhouse gas pollution and SJ Res 26, ideological models may be dominant. This makes some intuitive sense. Unless a tangible and centralized economic benefit can be seen for a district as a result of a vote, a MC will resort to his ideological and partisan motivations for voting. If the legislator does not, the loss of the benefit or the introduction of a high cost can hurt her at the polls or otherwise damage her reelection chances.

What may be the most difficult for studies of environmental voting or studies of Congress in general is what is not captured in roll call votes (see Vandoren 1990). Due to negative agenda control in the House or institutional rules in the Senate, many issues cannot make it to the floor to be subject to a roll call vote. In fact, we should expect parties to prevent roll calls in these areas (Cox and McCubbins 2005). As Oppenheimer (2012) explained in discussing the use of delay and filibuster on energy votes in the Senate, a motivated minority can

prevent any progress on bills. The economic influences of congressional decision-making may be active at any one of these stages and not be able to be studied by examining the roll call voting record given the Senate's institutional rules.

Specific, policy-changing environmental roll call votes can provide evidence of the economic model of Congressional voting. Systematic studies show that these types of state economic-interest variables have a modest, at best, influence on voting behavior. In the end, ideology is an effective and parsimonious variable that can be used to account for voting behavior on environmental issues and the general roll call record. But as was discussed previously, and most exhaustively discussed by Lee (2009), we really do not have a total understanding of what this variable is measuring or what it means in reality. Economic, constituency, and partisan influences are all endogenous to a legislator's NOMINATE ideology. If we can use this finding to understand where and why the ideological model underperforms, or where economic models provide a more accurate conception of environmental policymaking, a more detailed understanding of congressional voting behavior may be possible.

Representation in Immigration Policy Voting

The case of immigration policy voting provides an excellent test for the study of issue politics in an era of polarization. While parties have adopted different policy positions on the issue of immigration at large, more specific or technical

programs provide areas where MCs may wish to stake out a position that differs from their own party platform. I argue here that the uneven geographic dispersion of economic interests, issue constituencies, and political culture provide important influences on roll-call voting that may illustrate the impact of other dimensions, outside of the right-left unidimensional model.

For immigration issue voting, I argue that the district-level variables for the demographics and political culture of states will produce an impact on voting independent of their first-dimension NOMINATE ideology score. I also expect that senators who represent states classified as having “traditionalistic” political cultures will take similarly “traditionalistic” approaches to immigration policy. A thorough discussion of Elazar’s (1994) ideas about how political cultures shape policy considerations can be found in Chapter One. The hypothesis of “traditionalistic” political cultures impacting immigration policy voting is straightforward. Traditionalistic political cultures are conservative in the sense of wishing to maintain the social and political order. Immigration policy issues provide a perfect example of the possible effects of traditionalist culture. Mandating English as the official language of government was not an issue in many states historically, but in an era of changing demographics the official status of English now is divisive. Similarly, attempts to defund “sanctuary

cities,” or cities that create statutes authorizing local law enforcement to disregard federal immigration policy, rely on a traditionalistic argument.

Perspectives on Immigration Policy and Representation

This section focuses on five immigration policy votes during the 110th U.S. Senate. These votes were all on amendments to the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (CIR, S. 1348). These votes were either for adoption of a proposed amendment, or in one case on a motion to table, and therefore kill, an amendment. These five votes are in no way meant to be an exhaustive consideration of immigration related issues, but they were chosen because they represent different immigration policy issues considered during CIR. A bird’s eye view of the process, considering all 35 roll-call votes on the immigration reform bill, would lack the nuance necessary for understanding specific policy choices and senators voting calculus. After reading floor debates and journalistic coverage of the immigration reform effort, I choose salient policy choices and examine them individually. Again, returning our focus to the level of individual MCs and specific votes allows us to consider the nuance of the floor record as well help understand the roll record.

The concern here is unpacking the complicated interaction of ideology and constituency interests, but the larger focus is still on understanding how MCs represent their constituencies. As such, this research contributes to a long

line of empirical investigation into the nature of Latino representation in legislatures. Specifically, how might a body like the Senate, which has a vast disparity in its descriptive representation of the population², substantively represent the interest of its Latino or foreign-born constituents?

The language and theoretical approach to understanding “representation” in political science is largely drawn from two perspectives. The classic approach was the dichotomy created by Burke (1906, 1774) who distinguished between the elite and individual perspective of a “trustee” and that of a “delegate” who votes based on the opinion of the public. But when we shift perspectives to the representation of groups, the language of Pitkin (1967) guides the literature. Scholars of minority group representation use Pitkin’s categorization of “descriptive” and “substantive” methods of representation. Descriptive representation is based on a legislature, committee or council having membership that is “descriptive” of the population that they are representing. Descriptive representation can be contrasted with “substantive” representation, where members of another or the dominant group represents minority group interests.

Here, the focus is substantive issue representation in the Senate. The literature suggests that the relative size of the Latino population in a state may be correlated with substantive representation. Welch and Hibbing (1988) provide

one of the first examinations of these issues and conclude that, at least for the House of Representatives, substantive representation is evident, yet perhaps disproportionate “to the influence that their numbers warrant (297).” Lubin (1997) also found evidence of an influence for Latino population size on minority issue representation in Congress.

Other literature rejects the idea of substantive representation and relative population size. Minta’s (2009) finds no evidence of constituency influence on oversight and committee behavior of members of the house, instead finding that the descriptive identities of legislators, Latino and Black, are related to these “workhorse” activities. There is a similar exchange between Hero and Tobert (1995) and Kerr and Miller (1997) who reach alternative conclusions on the influence of substantive and descriptive using similar data. Given this dispute within the existing literature, this analysis contributes to an enduring debate.

What does substantive representation of the Latino population mean? As mentioned previously, we will consider immigration votes in the 110th Senate for the data. But is immigration really an issue for Latinos? And, do Latino’s have distinct preferences from white constituents or other groups? Pollsters note that Latinos care about the economy more than immigration (Saad 2012). However, in that *Gallup* poll, healthcare, unemployment and immigration were all tied at 20% for the most important issue for Latinos in the US. For the general population,

healthcare and the economy tied at 20% of respondents each, with immigration only being important for 8% of the adult respondents (*ibid.*). Griffin and Newman (2007) provide evidence for both: 1) the disparity between Latino issues and other groups and 2) the evidence of unequal substantive and descriptive representation. This study attempted to quantify the observed difference between Latino opinion and other groups. For instance, the difference between Latino and White opinion is less than the difference between the <25k and >75k income demographics, but five times the difference between men and women.

Given this background, the relative size of the Latino and foreign-born populations is expected to impact the statistical likelihood of pro-immigration voting in the Senate. Control variable for the education levels within a district and the first dimension NOMINATE ideology of the senator are also included. Finally, for theoretical reasons discussed previously, I include a dichotomous variable for states that have been categorized as having traditionalistic political cultures. The results of these logit models are presented in Table 3.3.

Bingaman Amendment: Guest Worker Quotas:

As part of the amendment process for the Comprehensive Immigration Reform act of 2007 (CIR), Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) offered a highly technical amendment regarding the number of guest worker visas that can be awarded each year. The bill was the product of numerous previous attempts at legislation

and was largely a result of compromise among the “gang of twelve,” with core leaders like John McCain (R-AZ), Ted Kennedy (D-MA), John Kyl (R-AZ), Ken Salazar (D-CO), Diana Feinstein (D-CA) and Mel Martinez (R-FL). The amendment proposed by Sen. Bingaman sought to reduce the number of guest

Table 3.3: Logit Models of Immigration Policy Votes in the 110th U.S. Senate

	Bingaman Amendment	Salazar Amendment	Inhofe Amendment	Cornyn Amendment	Vitter Amendment
(Intercept)	7.118* (2.611)	-5.523 (3.773)	-3.232* (2.969)	0.120* (2.868)	5.482 (3.616)
Traditionalistic Political Culture	0.251 (0.724)	-1.937 (1.398)	5.044* (2.034)	2.072+ (1.121)	-2.364+ (1.373)
Latino Population	-0.082* (0.039)	0.121+ (0.072)	-0.389* (0.140)	-0.018 (0.067)	-0.045 (0.084)
Foreign Born Population	0.060 (0.075)	-0.125 (0.193)	0.121 (0.134)	-0.325* (0.146)	0.101 (0.180)
NOMINATE	-2.998* (0.875)	-10.439* (2.777)	17.044* (3.353)	8.201* (1.954)	-9.657* (2.148)
B.A. Degree Holders	-0.311* (0.143)	-0.458+ (0.244)	-0.534* (0.265)	0.178 (0.171)	-0.208 (0.577)
N	98	97	97	96	98
-2LLR	26.017*	93.567*	91.796*	-89.013*	100.877*

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, + = $p \leq 0.1$; * = $p \leq 0.05$

workers to 200,000 from an original level of 400,000. Additionally it changed the formula for increasing these visas within the first few years. Bingaman’s floor speech in support of the amendment outlines some key critiques. Chief among these for Bingaman and his co-sponsor, and future president, Barack Obama (D-IL) is that this high number of visas would begin a program that requires

workers to stay for two years and then leave the country. As then Senator Obama put it “As we have learned with misguided immigration policies in the past, it is naive to think that people who do not have a way to stay legally will just abide by the system and leave (153 *Cong. Rec.* S6511; 2007).” Rising in opposition to the Bingaman amendment was Sen. Edward Kennedy, an ideological ally who would become Obama’s strong supporter in the 2008 presidential race. Kennedy argued that the program was necessary to avoid the “backdoor” nature of entry that many migrant workers use, but he graciously admitted that he was “reluctantly opposed” to the amendment before the roll call took place. Similar intra-partisan debate was taken between Republicans Mel Martinez of Florida and Jeff Sessions of Alabama, as Martinez insisted, like Kennedy, on keeping the original compromise of the bill. Sessions, alternatively, liked the reduction in the granting of guest worker visas on grounds of opposing large, new government programs.

Bingaman’s amendment was adopted, 74-24, with a noticeable abstention by “gang of twelve” member and presidential aspirant John McCain. The results of the logit model show that those members with higher Latino populations were more likely to vote for the bill, although the first dimension ideology score was also statistically significant. This model left the most unexplained variance of any of the five models.

What is the conservative position on the Bingaman amendment? The conservative-leaning U.S. Chamber of Commerce included this on their 2007 scorecard of the Senate, taking the same “nay” position as Senator Kennedy the 6th most liberal senator of the time. Republicans of many stripes took alternative positions, and the most conservative wing of the party was grouped on the “nay” side of the vote, preferring to keep the large-scale guest-worker program in the original CIR. There was a finding of Latino issue representation, though the impact was slight.

Inhofe and Salazar Amendments: English Language Politics

Immigration politics and policies often center on the requirements for assimilation. Those who stress the importance of assimilation often argue that English should be made the official language of government. During consideration of CIR, there were two amendments proposed regarding the status of English. The first, considered here, was a strict observation of the “official language” idea. The proposal from Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK) made English the official language of all government documents with only minor exceptions. Alternatively, Ken Salazar (D-CO) made a separate amendment that provided for the official status of English, while allowing citizens to request documents in a variety of languages.

Consideration of the reform had caused the Senate to use the evening hours to work on the legislation, and it was well past 10:00pm when successive roll calls on amendments to CIR took place. The first vote was taken on the Salazar amendment, and it was adopted by a vote of 58 to 39. As the model in Table 3.2 demonstrates, there is a statistically significant impact for the first dimension ideology variable as well as the Latino population variable, though the Latino variable is outside the comfortable level of significance. Perhaps most interesting is the negative coefficient for the population variable. A reasonable explanation for this could be the amendments sponsor, who was only the third Latino senator since 1977. Additionally, this bill actually required official documents to be printed in different languages for anyone receiving services from the United States. Senator Inhofe provided this perspective on the alternative amendment:

If you are opposed to English as the national language of the United States, then vote for the Salazar amendment. That is exactly what it does. His amendment says anyone who receives Federal money is entitled—this is an entitlement—to have the documentation in any language he or she chooses. It could be in Swahili, French, any other language. (153 *Cong. Rec.* S7160; 2007)

Though the Salazar amendment was adopted, it proved a short-lived addition to the bill. Salazar's language was replaced by the Inhofe Amendment on the subsequent vote that was adopted 64 to 33. All of the variables of interest for the Inhofe vote choice model were statistically significant with the impact in

the hypothesized direction. States with traditionalistic political cultures and a lower percentage of Latino citizens were more likely to see their senator vote in favor of the Inhofe Amendment. The impact for first dimension ideology was significant, as in all the models considered in this section.

Cornyn Amendment: Law Enforcement File Sharing or “Report to Deport”:

Of particular importance to CIR was the creation of “Z” visas that, though differing in the specific policy language, would allow an undocumented resident to obtain legal residency, wait a number of years, pay a fine, and then become eligible for citizenship. The Cornyn amendment attempted to restrict these visas and proposed that data obtained in the application for these visas should be shared within the law enforcement community and be verified to check for evidence of gang affiliation and a number of other issues in applicants’ backgrounds.

As a member of the “gang of twelve” Sen. Kennedy often acted as the voice of Democratic compromise during consideration of CIR, even when opposing the Bingaman amendment. In a classic example of framing in congressional rhetoric, Kennedy referred to the Cornyn proposal as a “report- to- deport” amendment (153 *Cong. Rec.* S7145; 2007). Kennedy attempted to show that the interests of public safety required confidentiality in these applications so that undocumented immigrants might take advantage of the system, rather than

continuing to avoid interacting with any law enforcement agency. Sen. Cornyn painted an image of “binding the hands of law enforcement” in alluding the possible threats that these applicants could represent, including DWI offenders and gang members, among others (153 *Cong. Rec.* S7144; 2007).

The Cornyn amendment was adopted, 57 to 39. The vote was largely along partisan lines, as reflected in the significance for the NOMINATE ideology score. Most interesting in this model was the significance of the variable for percent foreign-born. Theoretically, this makes a great deal of sense. You may notice that the coefficients for each of the population variables have different directions of influence in 4 of the 5 models. This amendment is no different. Although there is some correlation between foreign-born and Latino populations ($R^2 = 0.518$) and they may have preferences that overlap, we may expect some policy attitudes to be different. For instance, the foreign-born measure captures areas where there are a large number of immigrants, but not from Latino backgrounds. Given the control for the Latino population in the model, this is a measure of states that rely on immigration, but not from Latino immigrants. In this case, it shows that senators from states with high numbers of immigrants were less likely to support the Cornyn amendment. There was also a modest correlation between traditionalistic states support for this amendment. Again, those political cultures that value a preservation of existing social structures and

norms should be opposed to any policy that creates more immigration, especially if the target of the population is assumed to be criminal.

Vitter Amendment: "Sanctuary" Cities:

During consideration of a continuing budget resolution, Sen. David Vitter (R-LA) introduced an amendment, co-sponsored by Sen. Inhofe (R-OK), that prohibited COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) grants from funding cities that have passed policies that authorize local law enforcement agencies to ignore aspects of federal law regarding immigration and customs enforcement (ICE) or other related law enforcement groups. These "sanctuary cities," as both supporters and opponents call them, have been part of localized efforts to reform immigration policy. In recent times there has been a backlash of cities who might be called "no-sanctuary cities," which require additional effort on the part of law enforcement, landlords and employers in monitoring immigration status. In either case, the localized approach to immigration policy has been an increasing part of policy activity in the US.

The debate was short on this amendment, containing few floor remarks. This is partly due to the agenda for amendments to the CBR was long and each was considered in quick order. The lines of this debate were mostly partisan. Senators Durbin and Reid spoke on behalf of opponents and utilized a public safety frame similar to that of Kennedy during the Cornyn amendment. These

two Democratic stalwarts insisted that 1) the real threat to crime was the fear of immigrants in speaking with law enforcement and 2) removing grant money from the police budgets of 26 cities (154 *Cong. Rec.* S2063; 2008).

The vote considered in the fifth model in Table 3.3 is a motion to table, and therefore kill the Vitter amendment, which was successful 58-40. The model shows clearly that ideology is the most important variable of interest of those considered in this chapter. But senators from states with traditionalistic political cultures were also more likely to vote against this amendment. Republicans from the Midwest, Lugar, Hagel, and Voinovich all voted to table the amendment, while Democrats from the South, Landrieu and Warner found themselves against their partisan coalition. But this model still shows strong support for the usage of unidimensional ideology. With the exception of Elizabeth Dole (R-NC) each senator who voted against their own partisan majority was within the zone of moderate legislators, occupying the median third of Senators within the 110th Congress.

Conclusion: Issue Representation and Ideology

The uneven dispersion of economic activity, ethnic populations and political culture creates an atmosphere in which, even in a polarized political climate, MCs must balance these alternative considerations. As the debates during sessions on the CIR demonstrate, most of the legislation was the product of

compromise that should have, in theory, shielded the Senators from controversial position taking. In fact, theories of parties in Congress stress the importance of structuring legislation that can beat possible pivotal legislators (Krehbiel 1998 ; Tsebelis 2002) or to keep the majority party unified (Cox and McCubbins 2005).

This chapter has considered the relative explanatory power of the unidimensional ideological and constituency interest models of legislative voting behavior. In the polarized era of the modern Senate, a unidimensional structure within the roll-call record should be commonplace. But this analysis shows evidence that on significant, policy-impacting roll call votes, there is an influence for constituency interests. Those interests were shown most dramatically in the consideration of biodiesel subsidies and in consideration of a federal English language law. In those cases, there was an observable statistical relationship between theoretically important constituency variables and vote choice, even when controlling for first dimension NOMINATE ideology. A vote-level view at the roll call record shows a more dynamic atmosphere than presented from birds-eye views of the record. There may indeed be a role for political culture, minority group representation, interest group influence, or any one of the many effects that an earlier school of congressional researchers and many contemporary commentators note on a daily basis.

What pattern emerges from this data? Constituency interests appear in instances when a dimensional issue can be highlighted outside the traditional unidimensional debate lines. The comparison between the SJ Res 26 and biodiesel subsidies shows how this can happen. Subsidy programs that target a specific crop or industry, like biodiesel, can highlight constituency economic interests to influence voting decisions. Similarly, a policy like the strict English language law proposed by Sen. Inhofe can force those senators from states with high Latino populations to consider the electoral consequences of their vote. It seems no accident that the only GOP senator to vote against the Inhofe Amendment, Sen. Pete Dominici (R-NM), comes from the state with the highest Latino population.

Chapter Two demonstrated the persistent dimensionality on the roll call record and identified issue areas where this dimensionality can be observed. Though SJ Res 26 was ostensibly about environmental policy, it was only symbolic action that promoted the “sense of Congress” on global warming. Unlike biodiesel, it conferred no direct subsidies to specific industries. Unlike the Inhofe’s English language law, there were no direct penalties on a population. SJ Res 26 was part of a unidimensional ideological debate about regulation and the role of government, and an emerging partisan battle over recognizing global climate change. While the issue areas outlined in Chapter Two are likely

candidates for dimensional voting considerations, the polarized climate of Congress means that debates in these area areas are often tied to unidimensional or partisan conflicts. To highlight an extra dimension of preferences, roll calls must confer costs or benefits to economic, cultural or population based interests.

Constituencies and Environmental Voting in the House of Representatives

“The question for legislators is how much they should consider the *known* policy preferences of *attentive* publics as opposed to the *potential* policy preferences of *inattentive* publics when they are deciding which side to support on a policy dispute.” (Arnold 1991, 65; emphasis added)

Following a defeat in the 2012 Senate Republican primary, six-term Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) released a statement to explaining his interpretation of the loss. Lugar mentioned a number of factors that, he felt, caused him to lose the seat he held since Jimmy Carter inauguration. Largely, Lugar thought that his primary was decided before his challenger entered the race. Stating simply that: “the re-election of an incumbent to Congress usually comes down to whether voters agree with the positions the incumbent has taken. I knew that I had cast recent votes that would be unpopular with some Republicans and that would be targeted by outside groups (CNN 2012).” Citing votes confirming Supreme Court justices Sotomayor and Kagan, as well as votes on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), Lugar knew that he could pay an electoral price for his positions. It was not only moderates on the Republican side who faced electoral consequences in primaries. In 2006, Joe Lieberman, former Democratic vice-presidential candidate lost a Senate primary to a more ideological extreme

candidate, Ned Lamont. While Lugar's votes on TARP and liberal Supreme Court justices may have written his epitaph, it was the Iraq war that forced Lieberman to return to the Senate as an independent.

Recent published research has countered the claim "getting primaried" is a growing phenomenon (Boatright 2013). The data on primary challenges do show that there may not be an increase in the trend of successful primary challenges, just changes to the nationalization of fundraising and election coverage. But these primary challenges may result in changing behavior if senators and representatives, like Senator Lugar, believe them to be trends. How important is the primary constituency to a MCs voting calculus? Do the "potential preferences" (Arnold 1990, 10) of multiple constituencies feature in roll call voting? Using the *Congressional Election Study* by Stone (2010) this paper explores the influence of primary constituency ideology on environmental roll call voting.

In Chapters Two and Three, environmental policy votes displayed second-dimension considerations and a role for constituency interests. This chapter shows that often, MCs dimensional preferences may be suppressed in the face of an ideologically extreme primary constituency that prioritizes the first dimension of preferences. This speaks to the broader argument that the observed unidimensionality of the modern Congress may be a result of prioritizing a primary constituency, rather than the failure of a constituency-interest model.

Primary Voters and Congressional Behavior

A central underpinning of the argument that Senator Lugar and others is that primaries play a role in tempering the behavior of MCs. Huntington (1950) first presented an argument featuring a role for multiple constituencies, linking the changes in district ideological polarization to changes in district behavior, where there is an inverse relationship between the qualitative differences between parties (policy positions) and the quantitative differences (vote share).

Abramowitz (2012) demonstrates how polarization within the electorate has led to a reduction of moderates in the Senate. But some authors disagree on the level of partisan polarization in the average public (Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006; Fiorina and Abrams 2008). This may be part of a process of “moderate extremism” described by Merrill and Grofman (1999), in which multiple elections and strategic behavior can lead to relatively extreme candidates compared to the median voter, but not necessarily ideological outliers. These overlapping constituencies of electoral support has been given significant attention in the congressional literature, including a MCs “home style” (Fenno 1978), the importance of “intensity” of positions within constituencies (Kingdon 1981), and the pull of “sub-constituencies” (Bishin 2000).

Burden (2004) found that candidate divergence (polarization) is partially due to the ideological positioning of primary voters. Echoing that finding, Brady

et al. (2007) showed that candidate's ideology is pulled away from the district median and towards the primary voters, moderate incumbents are likely to face primary challengers, and more extreme candidates do better in primary elections. While these authors provide compelling evidence on the role of the primary electorate, others refute this claim. Ansolabhere et al. (2001) presents three patterns in the data which "cast doubt" on this logic (152). First, in 1996 candidates who faced a primary challenger voted more centrally ideologically than those who did not face primary challengers. Second, as districts become more heterogeneous, the MC is likely to converge on the district preferences. Finally, the authors find the changes in responsiveness, which decreased since the introduction of party primaries, but to a point lower than the 1940 period with virtually no primaries a phenomenon that "begs explanation (153)."

Critiques of the multiple constituencies argument are largely misguided. In many cases the data does not necessarily support their conclusion, or could be interpreted differently and observationally equivalent. First, in 1996 it is possible that moderates were more likely to face challengers because of their moderate voting behavior. The party faithful rewards those MCs who vote away from the district median, on behalf of primary supporters, with a free pass to the general election, as Brady et al. (2007) found. Second, if MCs tend to position themselves at the district median in heterogeneous districts, doesn't it follow that in

homogeneous districts, the dominant party or primary constituency has the most pull? Finally, they will get no argument from Gerber and Morton (1998) and Burden (2004), who also argue that responsiveness has decreased due to an institutional change to primaries. The answer to the question of why responsiveness to the district has fallen to 1940s levels can be found in parties, who allow the strong partisans to choose candidates. Candidates must win the support of primary voters at the ballot box, rather among party leaders in back rooms. As described by Schattschneider (1960), the change in the scope of conflict within the primary system seems a likely culprit for changes in MC convergence with district preferences. When the conflict is among strong partisans, in back rooms of party bosses or ideologically polarized primaries, they will diverge.

Given the literature described previously, I argue that the environmental voting behavior may reflect the importance of primary voters, sometimes over the general electorate. MCs that face more moderate primary constituencies will be more likely to vote moderately on salient issues on the roll call agenda, whereas MCs who must face more ideologically extreme primary constituencies cannot make the same choices. This expectation holds on both sides of the ideological continuum, where the conservatism and liberalism of the primary electorate is rewarded with policy that reflects their ideology.

This analysis relies on the *Congress Election Study* conducted by Stone (2010). In October of 2006, Stone surveyed political elites by mail in 155 congressional districts. These political elites were chosen due to their status as delegates at the 2004 Democratic and Republican national conventions. The 155 districts represented a random sample of 100 districts, and an additional purposive sample of 55 competitive districts. For this analysis, only the randomly sampled districts were included in the research presented here.³ A total of 970 delegates participated in the survey, a response rate of 21%.

The key independent variable of analysis was a measure of primary extremism. Respondents in Stone's survey were asked to describe the ideology of a number of actors and populations that included themselves, general election voters, primary voters, and candidates. A purged mean of the respondent answers for each district were used.⁴ The original scale for this variable was a seven-point ideology (1= "very liberal"; 4= "middle of the road"; 7= "very conservative"). To compare Democrats and Republicans within the same scale, a four-point "primary extremism" scale was constructed.⁵ The influence of this variable will be contrast with a measure of general election support. The vote share for John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election, a common variable for previous research on this subject, is used to measure the general election ideology.⁶ Beyond the measure of district partisanship, the data contain other

important variables for this analysis. First, controls for other district characteristics were needed. Here, the white percent of the total population in the district as of the 2000 census is utilized for a measure of the racial diversity. A variable for district wealth was also included for the mean income, in thousands, of the district as of the 2000 census.

The analysis will focus on environmental voting using the scores of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores for the 2006 legislative session (League of Conservation Voters 2013). Table 4.1 shows the votes considered in this session. Environmental voting was used as a case in the previous chapters to examine changing dimensionality over time and how issue votes can be influenced by constituency factors. The biodiesel and SJ Res 26 votes were taken from the 2010 Senate scorecard. The LCV is commonly used to measure and contains salient, policy-impacting votes on environmental issues. MCs are aware that these votes may be used to score their voting behavior, so it provides an opportunity for position taking (Fenno 1978, Roberts and Cohen Bell 2008). Importantly, these scores represent actual roll calls that have been seen as influential signals of a MCs preference on environmental conservation, and the MCs are aware that they may be held accountable for these votes. Figure 4.1 shows the relationship of LCV scores and primary extremism variables. Observations and a least-squares line are also included for each party.

Table 4.1: 2006 League of Conservation Voters House Key Vote Summary

LCV Name	Roll	Vote	Summary and Description
Food Safety	32	283-139	Rogers (R-MI) HR4167: The National Uniformity for Food Act. Requires all food labeling laws to be guided by federal standards. This would invalidate California's more strenuous reporting requirement on the use of chemicals in processed food. NO is the pro-environment vote.
Low Income Energy Assistance	66	287-128	Snowe (R-ME) amendment to SCR 83 to add \$1b of funding for low income housing insulation and weatherization. YES is the pro-environment vote.
Salvage Logging	147	189-236	Rahall (D-WV) amendment to H.R. 4200 that would strike the bill's waivers of the National Environmental Policy Act and other environmental laws in the bill. YES is the pro-environment vote.
Salvage Logging	151	243-182	Vote on HR4200 the Forest Emergency Recovery and Research act. Would permit logging in national forests after fires with waivers for traditional protections in the National Environmental Policy Act. NO is the pro-environment vote.
Toxic Release	165	231-187	Pallone (D-NJ) and Solis (D-CA) amendment to prevent EPA from lowering reporting requirements on toxic chemicals. YES is the pro-environment vote.
Drilling Royalties	167	252-165	Hinchey (D-NY) amendment preventing oil companies involved in deep-water drilling in the Gulf benefiting from unlimited royalty relief from receiving future drilling leases. YES is the pro-environment vote.
Tongass Logging Roads	168	237-181	Chabot (R-OH) and Andrews (D-NJ) amendment to end taxpayer subsidies for new commercial logging roads in the Tongass National Forest. YES is the pro-environment vote.
Clean Water	169	222-198	Oberstar (D-MN), Leach (R-IA), and Dingell (D-MI) amendment that would force the EPA to rescind a directive on small bodies of water and reaffirm a broad application of Clean Water Act protections. Yes is the pro-environment vote.
Offshore Drilling	170	217-203	Putnam (R-FL), Capps (D-CA), Davis (D-FL), and Foley (R-FL) amendment to keep a moratorium on drilling within 3 miles of the shoreline in place. YES is the pro-environment vote.
ANWR	209	225-201	H.R. 5429, a bill to allow drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve (ANWR). NO is the pro-environment vote
Oil Refineries	232	238-179	Bass (R-NH) and Barton (R-TX) H.R. 5254, Refinery Permit Process Schedule Act, a bill to expedite the refinery permitting scheme. NO is the pro-environment vote
Offshore Drilling	356	232-187	Jindal (R-LA) H.R. 4761, Deep Ocean Energy Resources Act. Would permit oil and gas drilling within 100 miles and give states the option to allow drilling as close as three to seven miles off their coasts. NO is the pro-environment vote.

Figure 4.1 The Influence of Primary Voter Ideology on LCV Scores




Table 4.2 shows the results of an OLS regression of the LCV scores on primary extremism and other district control variables. The data was subset by political party providing two models for each voting score. All of the independent variables in the model were measured prior to 2006, and were sourced from the *Congressional Election Study*. LCV scores are measured out of 100, where 100 is the most environmentally friendly for the LCV, for this year there are 13 votes so around 8 points for each vote. As an OLS model, the coefficients in the model allow for ready interpretation of the magnitude of the results. For instance, for a Republican representative, moving from “Somewhat Conservative” to “Conservative” indicates a swing of 20 points on the LCV scorecard, or 2-3 votes. The standard error suggests that we can be confident the result is between 10-30 points for each move down the primary extremism scale.


Table 4.2: The Influence of Primary and General Election Ideology on Environmental Voting

	Democratic Model	Republican Model
(Intercept)	-46.544* (19.011)	-27.305 (36.08)
Primary Extremism	6.001 (3.916)	-19.781* (9.043)
Kerry Vote 2004	1.239* (0.248)	0.873 (0.543)
White Population	0.239* (0.115)	0.263 (0.265)
Mean Income	0.713* (0.254)	0.778* (0.332)
N	52	43
R ²	0.535	0.428

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = $p \leq 0.05$

To better facilitate observing how these changes impact the key votes, a post-estimation simulation of the models in Table 4.2.⁷ Both graphs demonstrate the expected change in a MC's LCV score as the primary electorate base tends toward extreme. Roughly every eight points on the LCV scale represents one "key" vote. The two graphs are placed vertically on one another to allow comparison of the two axis scales. The LCV scorecard ranges from 1-100, but this is broken between the two parties due to the lack of overlap. Comparing figures one and two, you can see how the simulations from the model reflect the actual observed values, but with confidence intervals and controls for other district variables.

Figure 4.2: Simulated Values of LCV Scores by Primary Voter Extremism



A Republican candidate in a district with a “somewhat conservative” primary population is expected to engage in environmental voting, as measured by the LCV scores, much more environmentally friendly than the party mean. For Republicans the mean LCV score is outside the confidence intervals for observations at the extremes. For both parties, this graph demonstrates the

changing nature of environmental voting as primary electorates vary in extremism. But the evidence presented here shows only a statistically significant difference for the Republicans.


Alternatively, for Democrats the mean is at all points still within the 95% confidence intervals shown. This is also evident in the model presented in Table 4.2, where the coefficient for the “Primary Extremism” variable in the Democratic model is not statistically significant, though it was in the hypothesized direction.

Median Voters vs. Primary Voters: Asymmetric Polarization?

The results presented in Table 4.2 suggest that for Republicans in this sample, primary voter’s ideology has an impact on environmental voting, where those with moderate primary bases may have, on average, six more “environmentally friendly” voting decisions as measured by LCV scorecard. But, the variable for the median voter ideology, here measured by the 2004 two-party vote share for John Kerry, shows the opposite result. In this specification, the role of the median voter ideology is not significant for the Republicans, but it is significant for the Democrats. Given the coefficient for the Kerry voteshare, the average impact of a 1% increase in the Kerry vote is about a 1.2-point increase in the LCV score for the Democratic representative. To illustrate this graphically, a simulation with similar specifications as Figure 4.2 was created to demonstrate the impact of median voter ideology on LCV scores.

The 95% confidence intervals in Figure 4.3 demonstrate how the changing vote shares for John Kerry correlate with the voting score given by the LCV. It is important to note that the simulations relied upon the observed values of the

Figure 4.3: Simulated Values of LCV Scores by Primary Voter Extremism



Kerry vote, for Republicans this was between 21-54%, for Democrats this was between 30-61%. The confidences intervals show that for Democrats there is a

strong statistical relationship that is much different than the median Democratic score.

This mixed result, the pull of median voters for Democrats and of primary voters for Republicans, is suggested by other researchers concerned with polarization in Congress. Hare, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2012) declare, “Polarization is real, and asymmetric.” By “asymmetric” they argue that Republicans are moving toward the ideological extremes at a level more quickly than their Democratic counterparts. The model of “asymmetric polarization” provided by Hare *et al.* explains the data on environmental voting presented here quite clearly. One can imagine a scenario in which Democratic members of Congress would want to avoid the “environmentalist” label in a general election contest in the same way that the “anti-regulation” label might be valuable in a primary election for Republican MCs.

Personal Ideology?

Previously we considered the role of primary voter and general election constituencies. But, dominant models of congressional behavior argue that the ideology of MCs will outweigh constituency influences, primary or general election, in determining voting preferences. Despite the influence of the different constituencies on environmental voting behavior in the models presented, the influence of a MCs personal ideology is still an important consideration. If, as

Poole and Rosenthal (2007) argue, MCs have a consistent ideology with which they base their votes, the model of MCs as “delegates” of any constituency seems less important. To understand the relative importance of the MCs personal ideology, each MCs first dimension *D-W Nominate* score (Poole and Rosenthal 2007; Carroll *et al.* 2011) replaced the variable for the 2004 Kerry vote share in the original models. Due to the high correlation between the D-W Nominate score and the Kerry vote share ($r^2 = 0.764$), multicollinearity prevents these measures from being included in the models simultaneously. If both measures are included, one or both of the variables are statistically insignificant, though often the primary election measure remains distinct from the null hypothesis of no influence.

A serious note of caution should be used in evaluating these models. It is problematic to include two measures of voting behavior, NOMINATE and LCV scores, in alternate sides of a regression model. NOMINATE scores use the votes included in the LCV scorecard as part of their classification scheme, and they track well with one another. But to evaluate an independent effect of primary extremism on environmental voting, these models can be useful. All other specifications in Table 4.3 remain the same as in Table 4.2.

Table 4.3: The Influence of Primary and MC Ideology on Environmental Voting

	Democratic Model	Republican Model
(Intercept)	-5.557 (13.364)	38.243 (32.627)
Primary Extremism	8.05* (3.964)	-21.15* (8.016)
D-W NOMINATE	-97.849* (26.375)	-50.536* (19,642)
White Population	-0.037 (0.093)	0.147 (0.26)
Mean Income	0.977* (0.26)	1.018* (0.284)
N	52	43
R ²	0.583	0.48

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, * = $p \leq 0.05$

Despite the small number of cases in the models for both Table 4.2 and 4.3, the robustness and consistency of the multivariate analysis is surprising. For environmental “key votes,” as measured by the LCV scorecard, there is often an observable statistical relationship between the ideology of the primary electorate and the voting preferences of MCs. This effect is shown to be independent of personal ideology, as measured by the first dimension D-W NOMINATE score for legislators in the *Congressional Election Study* sample.

There is also an obvious relationship between the NOMINATE measure and the LCV scores. In the models presented, the independent impact of primary voter ideology is 8 (± 4) for Democrat MCs and 21 (± 8) for each one-point change. Again, the coefficient is higher for Republicans, as suggested in the discussion of asymmetric polarization. Democratic legislators, in this model

specification, are expected to move about have one different “key vote” than the average Democrat for each move down the primary ideology spectrum.

Conclusion: Ideology, Representation and Constituency Responsiveness

Environmental voting, shown in previous chapters as being an important dimensional issue, can be suppressed in the face of an extreme primary constituency that values ideological purity. Chapter three distinguished votes that conferred costs and benefits, like subsidies or enhanced ID restrictions, and votes like SJ Res 26 that simply promoted policy ideas. Where costs and benefits were redistributed, dimensional considerations could be a factor in the voting calculus. Here, the evidence suggests that for MCs with extreme primary constituencies, second dimension considerations can be overruled. This does not imply a failure of constituency influence on MCs roll call behavior; in fact it indicates the opposite. As agents of multiple principles, it may be efficient representation to prioritize the preferences of the agent that has the most power over your reelection.

Though the models presented here confirm the effectiveness of *DW-Nominate* measures, there is room for “what else?” questions of congressional voting behavior. Recovering MC ideology from roll call votes and comparing member ideology over time is an important endeavor for the scholarly community focused on Congress. But, two points should be made here. Senator

Lugar's claims his votes on TARP, the strategic missile treaty with Russia, and the confirmation of Presidential appointments to the Supreme Court cost him his long-held Senate seat. If Sen. Lugar's logic is correct, and other senators and representatives are not as principled as he, the temptation to vote as a delegate of one's primary constituency will be large. Compromise may be difficult in this scenario. If, as the Mayhewian logic contends, MCs are solely concerned with reelection, this behavior seems predictable and highly rational. If one changes the lens of "representation" away from the general electorate, MCs may be calculating delegates of their primary constituency on many key votes.

Second, elections in Congress should be considered more as a source of *DW-Nominate* ideal points. In the highly polarized partisan era of the modern US Congress, party and ideology are correlated at nearly 96%. To be sure, this represents the rampant polarization evident on Capitol Hill (see Hare et al. 2012). But, it also requires us to examine the sources and examples where the ideological model does not perform well. This paper has demonstrated a link between constituents, both general election and primary, and their representatives voting behavior.

The picture of constituency links presented here is not unlike previous studies (Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Bishin 2000). MCs behavior is conditioned by a number of influences. Ideology may be chief among these, but the rational

Downsian model of representation is still evident in the data presented here, however the median may be shifted to the extremes of primary voters, at least for Republicans in the models presented here. Studies of congressional decision-making would benefit from a returned focus on the new nature of constituency representative relationships. Even if our measures of ideology, like NOMINATE, perform with high accuracy, the sources of these ideal points should still be of interest to any congressional scholar. The implications of legislative behavior extend beyond students of Congress, but inform our knowledge of policy change, political institutions, and their effects. If the analysis here is correct, constituency influence through elections may be alive and well. It is an open question, however, if that is good news.

Issue Constituencies, Political Culture and Abortion Voting in the Senate

Chapter Two demonstrated that abortion roll calls displayed attributes similar to civil rights votes in the period that Poole and Rosenthal argued intra-party divide on civil rights made it the content of the second dimension (1997, 57).

While it is unlikely that any single issue category creates the content spectrum for the second dimension in the modern unidimensional Congress, coalitions on abortion voting show a consistent statistical variation in the cutting angle, and that that is maintained on both procedural and other votes. Given these findings, it is important to explore issue voting on abortion policy from a detailed perspective, rather than the decades-wide consideration of the entire roll call agenda.

If the distribution of political cultures across the United States creates opportunities for policy considerations outside the traditional liberal-conservative first dimension, as discussed in the immigration section in Chapter Three, then perhaps we can expect a similar role for culture on abortion voting. Though there is evidence that abortion underwent an “issue evolution” (see Chapter One, Carmines and Stimson 1989, Adams 1997, Lindaman and Haider-

Markel 2002), it is difficult to place abortion on the traditional unidimensional issue space. Are abortion regulations a path to a larger or smaller government apparatus? Do abortion restrictions secure or limit the rights of an individual? Party divergence on abortion issue stances and voting could be a product of partisan conflict around issue ownership, rather than a small government- big government ideological debate. From this perspective, a traditionalistic political culture's focus on maintaining the existing moral and social order may influence voting behavior on abortion issues in the way that it was shown to be correlated with immigration votes considered in Chapter Three.

The previous chapter was focused on the role of primary voters and argued that a sub-constituency (Bishin 2000) ideology or extremism can influence key policy votes. The focus for Chapter Four was environmental voting as measured by LCV key votes in the House of Representatives and primary voters, here we consider issue advocates on abortion policy and their activities influence on abortion voting in the Senate. The arguments in each analysis provide a similar conceptual model of a MC confronted with a tough issue vote who, as Kingdon argues, anticipate and adjust their voting behavior to prevent possible negative electoral consequences (1981, 60-68). Arnold (1991) outlines a similar mechanism in his quote that begins the previous chapter. Should a Senator be concerned with an attentive public, who almost certainly will be engaged in the

political process come election time, or the possible outrage of an unspecified public? While the answer to this question is no doubt conditional, this chapter attempts to shed light on that question in a similar way that primary extremism was discussed in the previous chapter. Do abortion advocate groups exercise influence on the voting behavior of Senators when considering abortion policy votes?

Beyond the specific consideration of abortion advocacy activity in a state, this chapter will also contribute to the broader theme of issue calculus in Congress and the ideological content of the roll call record. Similar to Chapter Three, attention will be played to the policy issue considered, the frames and divisions among Senators making speeches from the floor and the eventual result of the vote. In the end, this analysis provides cautious support that abortion advocates (or the lack of abortion advocates) in a state may be a policy consideration for Senators. Political culture and the electoral environment of the state are the most important predictors of abortion policy voting considered here.

Perspectives on Abortion Activity in Congress

Abortion politics and policy has been a focus of attention for practical politicians, journalists and researchers for a number of decades. The issue looms large in American culture despite little ground for wholesale policy change absent a constitutional amendment. The most exhaustive attention to abortion voting in

Congress is by Ainsworth and Hall (2011) who contend that the electoral incentives surrounding the issue create an environment where MCs focus on “strategic incrementalism.” This logic relies on viewing abortion politics as a series of mobilizations and counter-mobilizations (Staggenborg 1991) and understanding that the risk of providing motivation to opponents or increasing the scope of conflict. This research also contributes to a classic discussion on the nature of group behavior and influence on policy (Bentley 1908; Truman 1971). Ainsworth and Hall argue, “Legislators may want to minimize sabotage efforts and ease their task of vote explanation” (2011, 54; see also Miller and Stokes 1963 on “explaining votes”). These perspectives fit nicely within the narrative of this research that strategic legislators are weighing the relative impact of their voting decision on their electoral constituencies, rather than their own ideologies.

The issue of abortion is also widely researched for those interested in polarization and issue evolution. Though Adams (1997) makes a convincing case for issue evolution on abortion, and others have commented on its role in polarization (Carmines and Woods 2002), many scholars pay attention to the prevalence of party splitting of legislators (as with Rep. Stupak discussed previously) and of the commonalities in public opinion. Ainsworth and Hall (2011) note that the most active sponsor of bills and amendments related to abortion was not a conservative of the moral majority ilk, but rather “liberal

stalwart” Rep. James Oberstar (D-MN) (125). Their data on bill sponsorship show 68.1% of abortion related bills by the most liberal members (NOMINATE score < -0.5) were pro-life in nature, and 73.6 of all Democratic MC abortion bills sponsorships were for pro-life measures (*ibid.* 127). For the last decade in their data (1993-2004), the numbers have begun to split and show evidence of issue evolution, yet still 39% of the abortion measures introduced by the “Most Liberal” legislators was pro-life in orientation (*ibid.* 130).

Moving from the halls of Congress to public opinion, there is a debate on the relative strength and state of polarization on abortion policy. Fiorina *et al.* (2005) make a strong claim that commonalities across parties and people are stronger than the differences within issue arenas like abortion. But as Adams (1997) analysis, Jelen and Wilcox (2003) review of the state of public opinion literature on abortion, and Abramowitz (2010, 45) consideration of polarization and citizen engagement levels demonstrate, party issue ownership and polarization are observable and have almost certainly increased over time. The important result of this debate within the literature is that political scientists have a hard time estimating the dispersal and strength of abortion opinions across the electorate. MCs operate in a similar environment of limited information on attitudes and the intensity of those attitudes within their districts.

Research Strategy

This analysis is focused on abortion policy voting in the 110th Senate (2007-2008).

The selection of cases for this chapter is more straight forward than used in Chapter Three, as there were only four votes containing the word “abortion” in their description for the 110th Senate. The hypotheses here are similar to the analysis in Chapter Three and Four. Ideological considerations may feature within votes, but measures of district political culture and subconstituencies can impact salient issue voting within Congress.

The dependent variable of interests will be pro-life voting choices on four amendments that contained the word “abortion” in the legislative summary of the vote. An additional model using the sum of the number of pro-life votes is also analyzed using a Maximum Likelihood Poisson model, appropriate for count data. The combination specific issue votes and a view of the sample of the roll call record provided by the 110th Senate allows for a discussion of both individual voting and broader policy themes. The roll call record on issues like abortion may be conflated by two different dynamics. There may be strategic reasons to avoid a recorded roll call on a specific vote (Lynch and Madonna 2013), yet Oldmixon (2005) reports that floor leaders are pressured by the intensity of some legislators who demand votes on issues (67).

The independent variables in these models come from state-level measures. The first independent variable of interest is the average vote for the Republican presidential candidate over the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections. This variable represents the median voter pull for each state; it also reflects the electoral safety and partisan strength of the states that may factor in a Senators voting calculus. A control variable for education levels in the state, a factor Gilens (2009) argues may be an important factor in public opinion on abortion, is included.

As in the immigration models presented in Chapter Three, this analysis considers the role of traditionalistic state political cultures. While “moralistic” cultures might seem like a more natural fit for questions like abortion, traditionalistic cultures are the ones that value maintaining the existing moral structure and on “paternalism” (Elazar 1994, 235).

A final variable of interest for this model is a measure for the activity of abortion protestors within a state. If, as Arnold argues, Senators value the known preferences of attentive publics, an active direct action branch of the abortion movement may be a sign that any action or vote on abortion policy will be noticed, and may feature as an issue in future electoral politics. The logic here is similar to that of Chapter Four, where the attitude of attentive primary voters may feature more prominently in the decision calculus of legislators. To measure the activity

of these groups, I utilize a measure provided by the Guttmacher institute (Jerman and Jones 2014) that provides the percentage of abortion clinics within a state that reported 20 or more protest acts in the previous year. The results of the models are presented in Table 5.1.

Brownback Amendments: International Grants and the “Mexico City Policy”

Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) provided two amendments regarding limits on grants to international organizations. These two amendments were for HR 2764, the appropriations bill for the State Department and other foreign operations.

The first amendment was the least restrictive on grant activity, and was a requirement that no funds will go to organizations that conduct forced abortions or sterilizations. An obvious target to such an act was any family planning NGO or IGO working within China, whose “One Child Policy” might require groups to engage in behavior that could be related to abortion. But Senator Leahy (D-VT) argued against the bill, enacting this amendment would mean that the United States could not give grants to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) (153 *Cong. Rec.* S11181; 2007). By a 48 to 45 vote, the Brownback amendment was adopted.

Table 5.1: Models of Abortion Voting in 110th Senate

	Brownback I (Logit)	Brownback II (Logit)	Vitter (Logit)	Ensign (Logit)	All Votes (Poisson)
(Intercept)	-12.763* (3.510)	-11.087* (3.279)	-14.036* (3.666)	-10.755* (3.374)	-4.803* (1.068)
Traditionalistic Political Culture	1.405+ (0.752)	1.593* (0.692)	2.317* (0.777)	0.930 (0.720)	0.660* (0.195)
Pro-Life Direct Action	0.022+ (0.013)	0.011 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)	0.013 (0.066)	0.006+ (0.003)
B.A. Degree Holders	0.153 (0.121)	0.162 (0.119)	0.304* (0.133)	0.066 (0.121)	0.068+ (0.040)
Average GOP Presidential Vote	17.146* (4.532)	13.418* (3.962)	14.363* (4.120)	17.344* (4.368)	6.915* (1.153)
N	83	84	84	88	85
Model χ^2	38.532*	29.404*	33.313*	39.176*	65.920*

*Note: Standard Errors in parentheses, + = $p \leq 0.1$; * = $p \leq 0.05$. Vote totals are not equal to 100 due to missing values for protest data in MA, MS, SC, and WY. Additionally, Sens. Obama, Clinton, McCain, and Biden missed 3 to 4 votes due to the 2008 presidential campaign. Finally, Sen. Craig (R-ID) missed these votes due to scandal.

As the first model in Table 5.1 demonstrates, the variables for political culture and electoral strength of the Republican Party were significant in the models. The measure for pro-life direct action was only significant at the less restrained level (actual value $p = 0.0867$). Using one-tailed significance test, this value would be above the critical value. There should be little doubt as to the directional hypotheses if direct action activity, so other researchers may be willing to comfortably report this finding. Perhaps the clearest way to state the uncertainty seen in this result is that, in 1:10 cases, we might expect the effect of

the direct-action branch to be zero, and as such the null hypothesis of no influence cannot be rejected.

The second Brownback amendment to the State Department and foreign assistance appropriation act was similarly targeted at grantees who may receive funds and use them on abortion related procedures. This vote contributes to an ongoing debate on what has come to be known as the “Mexico City Policy.” The Brownback amendment would solidify this policy and prevent grants from reaching groups in any way involved with abortion, including most NGOs who distribute contraception. In the first days of the George W. Bush administration, this policy was put into law by Executive Order, an action Sen. Leahy described as unnecessary due to existing restrictions on grants to abortion groups, it was in his mind, “settled policy” (153 *Cong. Rec.* S11192; 2007). Leahy, even as one of the longest serving Senators of the time remarked:

The Mexico City policy has been the subject of more political posturing, more press releases, more fundraising letters, more debates, more votes, and more Presidential vetoes, than virtually any other issue I can think of (*Ibid*).

Leahy’s argument here is the exact logic surrounding issue politics that this research proposes is unaccounted for in the ideology alone. Again, in this model the electoral considerations of party politics show the most observed influence on vote choice. Even controlling for the average Republican vote share and

education achievement within a state, the variable for traditionalistic political culture showed statistical significance. The amendment was rejected, 41 to 53.

Vitter Amendment: The Domestic Politics of Grants

As Ainsworth and Hall noted, the roll call voting on abortion policies are most likely to be incremental proposals, rather than constitutional amendment or large scale policy changes. The Brownback amendments and the Vitter amendment considered here represent the type of small-scale changes that allow MCs the opportunity for advertising and position taking with minimized risk. In both cases, they offer “gag rule” or funding restrictions that, ostensibly, are meant to prevent taxpayer funds from reaching certain groups engaged in contraceptive or abortion services. In the case of this amendment, Vitter is introducing his own amendment that would prevent any money from reaching groups that are any way involved in abortion services. This amendment is aimed at groups like Planned Parenthood International that are engaged in abortion services as part of a larger portfolio of women’s health and reproductive activities. Senator Vitter introduced this amendment as part of consideration of HR3043, the appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, HHS and Education.

Vitter makes a short case, similar to Brownback’s arguments and other funding related arguments on abortion policies. The senator then asks to introduces letters from both the Family Research Council and the Concerned

Women for America noting that this vote will be placed on their scorecard and advertised (153 *Cong. Rec.* S13060, 2007).

Senators Patty Murray (D-WA) and Barbara Boxer (D-CA) took to the floor to speak against the Vitter amendment. Boxer recalled that it was George W. Bush's grandparents who started the Planned Parenthood organization in Connecticut and took the libertarian stance saying that the amendment was "'Big Brother' at its very worst" (*Ibid.*). Senator Murray reflected on the long-standing Hyde Amendment's prohibition on the direct funding of abortion.

In Ainsworth and Hall's model, passage in their model requires large coalitions to guard against political risk. In this case, the defunding of a largely respected group like Planned Parenthood could be a problematic electoral move in many states. The model reflects that states with traditionalistic cultures and high average support for republicans were the likely supporters of the Vitter Amendment. Senators from those states may wish to have good ratings from the Family Research Council and related groups. In fact, in Vitter's home state of Louisiana, Governor Bobby Jindal has appointed the vocal leader of the Family Research Council Tony Perkins to important state boards.

It may be more accurate to reverse this discussion and that and say that in *non-traditionalistic* states with *low* margins of GOP support, support for the Vitter proposal was *unlikely*. Given the problems that some Republicans have had

discussing abortion policies in recent elections, Senators like Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Kit Bond (R-MO) may wish to be seen as less rigid on the issue than Senators like Brownback and Vitter, who try to take ownership of their position on abortion and incorporate it into their electoral enterprise.

Ensign Amendment: Issue Ownership and Symbolic Activity

As in the case of Sens. Vitter and Brownback, John Ensign (R-NV) made anti-abortion advocacy a foundation of his image and enterprise. Like Henry Hyde (Loomis 1990, 62; Warwo 2000) or Rep. Jim Oberstar's legislative activity on abortion activity, many MCs attempt to develop a reputation for issue advocacy and ownership. The Ensign amendment discussed here is an example of this type of issue ownership, however probably of a less policy-centered viewpoint. On this amendment, Sen. Ensign was attempting to secure funding for enforcing the "Child Custody Protection Act" that provided strict criminal penalties and funding for law enforcement to investigate possible movement of minors in search of abortion. The Ensign Amendment shifted 50 million dollars to fund the program as part of the funding package in SJ Res 70. The key problem with this proposal was that the Child Custody Protection Act was not, and was not likely to be law, a tactic that Sen. Boxer described as something out of "Alice in Wonderland" (154 *Cong. Rec.* S2070, 2008).

In a 49 to 49 vote, the amendment was rejected. As the model shows, the only variable of interest shown to be statistically significant is the variable for state Republican Party support. This amendment was brought to the Senate floor during consideration of a series of appropriations related amendments and the votes, many of which showed a similarly divided Senate. While many amendment votes on this same day dealt with billions of dollars in appropriations, massive changes to the estate tax code or other policy options, this was largely a symbolic vote.

This bill was funding a program that did not exist and would likely not be passed by the Senate and House before the Presidential election and end the Congress, only months away. Its purpose, it appears, was to force Senators to take a position on a long-standing policy issue. During the 109th Congress, Senator Ensign introduced the same bill, successfully passed the bill through two committees, though it eventually died.⁸ After the initial Senate vote, Sen. Ensign and then Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) took to a press conference with the head of the Susan B. Anthony's List, a pro-life interest group fashioned after Emily's List, to push for public support to get the bill through conference. In this way, you can imagine Sen. Ensign incorporating a previous policy proposal into the discussion of SJ Res 70 to allow for future advertising opportunities like he had been given in the previous Congress. One can only assume that Ensign knew the struggles it

would take to pass both the legislation and this funding amendment, and was largely seeking to enhance an existing legislative reputation and enterprise.

Conclusion: Advocates, Culture and Electoral Incentives

Senators must balance the competing concerns of engaged publics with known concerns and unengaged publics with potential preferences. As outlined in Chapter Three, the distribution of political cultures and economic interests across the US makes each MCs own calculus unique, but it is unlikely to be only influenced by their own ideology on a single dimension. Chapter Four outlined how these separate constituencies and influence may impact MCs in their environmental voting. Republican MCs with the least conservative primary constituencies were shown to support environmental voting well beyond the mean Republican LCV score. Similarly, Democratic legislators were shown to have environmental voting records that tracked with their district's support for John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election.

This chapter extends this model of vote influence to consider abortion policy voting in the Senate and shows a similar influence for activists, here measured by protest activities at clinics within a state, even controlling for other important district factors. In both the individual vote case studies and the overall count model in the fifth column of Table 5.1, traditionalistic political culture has a statistically significant impact on abortion voting decisions. As hypothesized,

in these traditionalistic states, mostly in the South or near-south, a culture of respect for the moral and social status quo has guided legislators to consider how the publics in their state might view their vote choices if they became a campaign issue.

In all cases the partisan support in a state was correlated with vote choice on these issues. The simplest explanation for this might be that more republicans mean more support for anti-abortion policies due to state conservatism. One might also argue that electoral security factors into this equation. Legislators are known to “uptake” issues that opponents might seek use against them in future campaigns (Sulkin 2005). Democrats in Bush winning states like Nelson (D-NE) Casey (D-PA), who each voted for 4 of 5 amendments, may have a calculated interest in keeping abortion off of the policy consideration in subsequent elections. This strategic perspective, rather than a fundamental personal ideology, may be influencing these policy decisions.

Another key finding in this chapter came from the detailed analysis of the *Congressional Record*, including floor speeches and the introduction of letters from interest groups showing their intention of adding the vote to their scorecards. The strategic behavior in introducing amendments, as hypothesized by Ainsworth and Hall, lends support to the overall argument of this volume. Legislator’s floor behavior represents a host of factors, only some of which are

related to their own unidimensional ideology. In many cases, as was the case with immigration policy in the previous chapter, it is the most liberal legislators who argue against new government programs and spending. These issues simply do not fit nicely on a unidimensional scale, even in a polarized era. Further, state level variables measuring issue activism or primary extremism, state political culture and educational achievement have been shown to influence these votes independent of ideology. The picture painted here of abortion politics demonstrates the nuance to these votes when viewed from the Senate floor, rather than as part of the entire roll call record.

Conclusion: Polarization, Ideology and Representation in the Modern Congress

“What, if anything, are we doing at the present time to study the subject, and the activity, of congressional representation? Have we done enough? Have we done our best? And how, in particular, might we undertake some further analysis of the constituency-centric world in which, for a good part of their careers, all members of the US House of Representatives live, work and undergo scrutiny.” (Fenno 2013, 2)

In February 7th of 2014, in the early days of the 103rd Congress’s second session, President Obama signed the Agriculture Act of 2014, or the “Farm Bill,” into law. The Farm Bill combined pieces of the Senate’s “Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2013, ” the House’s “Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2013,” the “Oilheat Efficiency, Renewable Fuel Research and Jobs Training Act of 2014, ” the “Chesapeake Bay Accountability and Recovery Act of 2013,” and the “Reducing Regulatory Burdens Act of 2013.” These separate bills were all germane to the Farm Bill’s overall goal of providing food, fuel and agricultural subsidies across the country and were combined into one omnibus package.

The case of Farm Bill legislation provides a textbook example of the dynamics of issue politics in a polarized setting covered in this volume. First, the benefits of the Farm Bill vary from state to state in important ways. All states get

some money, because food stamp or SNAP program receives its funding through the passage of the bill. But due to population differences across states, variations in the poverty levels and state implementation of the SNAP program, and the industries and crops centered around each district or state, the differences in dollars received per constituent could vary greatly. In short, the economic benefits of the legislation are unequally dispersed.

Models of vote choice, like the ones used in earlier chapters, demonstrate how the choices of legislators vary by district economic interest. Here, we use the Senate votes on cloture, and on adopting the conference report. The vote on cloture passed the Senate 72-22, with 6 senators not voting, and the conference measure passed 68-32, with all senators voting. In the models presented below, the first dimension NOMINATE score is included as a measure of the liberal-conservative ideology of the senator. The voteshare for Obama in 2012 is included to measure the influence state partisan support. Including both the NOMINATE and Obama voteshare is troublesome in these models due to the correlation between the two variables, however an additional model with both variables is found in Table 6.2 below. Finally, measures for the economic incentives surrounding the Farm Bill are added to the logit models. The first independent variable is a measure of possible SNAP users, which is simply the mean income for the state. A measure of state employment, by percentage, as

result of agriculture, forestry or fishing is included. In all cases where the multicollinearity resulting from inclusion of both ideology variables does not inflate the standard errors, the agriculture variable is significant. In addition, in the adoption of the conference report shows an influence for income levels, and therefore possible SNAP consumers, on vote choice on these issues.

**Table 6.1: Logit Models for Senate Votes on the HR2642:
"The Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2013"**

	Cloture	Cloture II	Cloture III	Conference Report	C.R. II	C.R. III
Intercept	5.504* (2.662)	-3.765+ (2.034)	8.213* (3.722)	-6.073* (2.116)	-0.963 (1.719)	9.460* (3.151)
NOMINATE	-4.863* (1.198)	-----	-5.648* (1.446)	-3.750* (0.884)	-----	-4.736* (1.151)
Obama '12 Voteshare	-----	0.093* (0.038)	-0.060 (0.054)	-----	0.065* (0.033)	-0.073+ (0.047)
Mean Income	-0.085 (0.048)	-0.008 (0.036)	-0.076 (0.049)	-0.107* (0.038)	0.041 (0.030)	-0.098* (0.039)
% Employed in Agriculture, Fishing or Forestry	0.403* (0.177)	0.376* (0.166)	0.299 (0.195)	0.249* (0.120)	0.280* (0.130)	0.168 (0.139)
N	94	94	94	100	100	100
Model χ^2	-35.324*	10.238*	-36.567*	31.210*	6.873	33.705*


In conducting this analysis, a search was made for other roll calls on the Farm Bill that might be interesting comparisons of ideological and constituency interests, or any related votes. Yet only five roll call votes were conducted on the legislation, the two you see in Table 6.1 and three in the house. The House of

Representatives voted on passage, to instruct conferees, and to adopt the conference report. In short, there were no “issue votes” to consider. Rather the specifics of the eventual policy were crafted in committees, either original standing committees or the conference committee.

An examination of votes, both recorded roll calls and voice votes, on the previous Farm Bills since 1980 shows the decline of recorded voting over time. Recorded votes have their advantages for MCs, they allow for position taking, facilitate advertising and can force political opponents to make difficult choices. But for a party leader attempting to maintain a majority, these votes can lead to intra-party divisions and may prevent the legislation from moving forward. In addition, as discussed in the previous chapter, MCs must consider the various constituencies and subconstituencies that may support a Farm Bill.

The grants and subsidies created by the Farm Bill are not dispersed across the United States in the same way that they are not evenly dispersed within states. The case of the Kansas Senate delegation is illustrative on this point. Senior Kansas Senator Pat Roberts, who will serve as the Chair of the Agriculture Committee in the 114th Congress, cast a vote against the Farm Bill, citing its “burdensome regulations,” “government subsidies,” and “unneeded give-aways to state government” as the reason for his vote (Kraske 2014). Yet the junior

Figure 6.1: Roll Call and Voice Votes on “Farm Bill” Legislation



senator from the state, Jerry Moran voted for the bill and though he describes it as “not ideal” he stated its benefits for Kansas farmers and ranchers (Roberts 2014). Roberts and Moran have a difference in first dimension ideology of 0.012, with Moran being more conservative at 0.431 to Roberts 0.419. They share the same constituency as well. As the more liberal senator and member of the Senate Agriculture committee, many would assume Roberts to be a member of the coalition supporting the legislation.

If their constituency characteristics and ideology did not differ, perhaps the largest difference between the two candidates was Robert’s impending primary election. Just four weeks after the vote, Public Policy Polling (PPP) conducted a poll of 365 GOP primary voters in Kansas and discovered that “very

conservative” Republican primary voters (32% of total polled) would prefer a candidate more conservative than Roberts at a margin of 62-26%. Among “conservative” primary voters (also 32% of the poll) the margin was 44-41%, within the margin of error but a coin toss or slight edge in favor of a more conservative candidate (Public Policy Polling 2014).

While Roberts would face a conservative primary challenge in August, less than eight months away, Senator Moran would not face an electoral opponent until the 2016 cycle. Roberts had to make a choice between a very conservative primary constituency who was threatening his long-held Senate seat, and the agriculture community of Kansas who he had represented on the Agriculture Committee in the Senate, and as Chairperson of the House Agricultural Committee in the Farm Bill passed in the 104th Congress. Poole and Rosenthal argue: “contemporary members of Congress do not adapt their positions during their careers, but simply enter and maintain a fixed position until they die, retire, or are defeated in their ideological boots” and “not only do they die with their ideological boots on, they don’t change them when they run for Senate (2007; 97, 100).” Yet on this important issue, both for his committee and his state, Roberts reversed years of support for the Farm Bill as chair of the House committee and as a member of the Senate committee.

The Utility of NOMINATE Scores

Many of the arguments in this volume have been against the ideological model of voting, most commonly represented in the work of Poole and Rosenthal, among others. Yet this criticism or critique of the overuse should not be construed to suggest that it is useless, or should not be used. The model of congressional decisionmaking highlighted in this research, is not unlike the work of Fenno, Kingdon, or others who describe the nuanced voting calculus that MCs must undergo. Other scholars of Congress, namely Mayhew's (1974) electoral incentive, Krehbeil or Tsebelis' (1988; 2002) veto-pivots, or Poole and Rosenthal's "ideological boots," all provide elegant models of what is obviously a complex process. The research in these pages is not a simple theory, or an overall theory of legislative activity at all, and only seeks to qualify or challenge certain components of other dominant theories.

The ideological model allows for a single concept and structure to account for the entirety of the roll call history in Congress, a contribution that has impacted the research efforts in numerous ways. Creating NOMINATE data has allowed scholars of Congress to do things that were really not possible in earlier periods. Measurement of the ideological distance, both within and between parties, is now possible. We can rank members of each house in order, determining who has displayed the most extreme and moderate voting

behaviors over their careers. We can now compare, side by side, the ideology of Davy Crockett (20th Congress, 1867) and Sonny Bono (104th, 1995); Sonny is more conservative at 0.389 to Crockett's moderate 0.054. So it is not just that this data allows us to answer questions previously impossible, we can now consider questions that were previously inconceivable.

Yet as a first-principle approach to understanding the institution, the ideological model has some downfalls. Unlike Mayhew's landmark work surrounding electoral incentives, the ideological model has little to say about the creation of the institution rules or the many other activities that MCs engage in outside of roll call voting. As the Fenno quote that began this chapter noted, little is done within the field of congressional studies that examines fundamental theoretical questions of representation, or on the personal nature of the congressional enterprise. The view from one vote, one member, or one committee provides a much more complex, and perhaps more realistic, picture than the view of tens of thousands of MCs or thousands of roll call votes. Both approaches should be given attention as the subfield develops further.

Looking Forward: "Heresthetics," Dimensionality and Gridlock in Congress

What does this research tell us about the future of Congress? While this analysis was not meant to be a general theory of voting, or a prediction for the future, there are implications for the arguments made here. As this chapter asserted, the

decreasing use of roll call voting for final passage and other votes should be expected to decrease (see also Lynch and Madonna 2013). Political scientists have long noted the importance of manipulating the scope of conflict to achieve political goals (Schattschneider 1960). As such, the prevalence of “gangs” may increase. Major policies may be crafted by a “gang of eight” or “gang of thirteen” rather than in an open committee process or through amendments on the floor through roll call voting. Using “gangs” will allow members with electoral safety, either from years of service or from moderate electoral districts” to take credit for crafting compromise legislation, while MCs on the ideological extremes can distance themselves from the compromise. This dynamic of using voice votes or closed door compromises also allows members to avoid taking possibly risky votes or issue positions when unnecessary.

A second important implication of the finding in these chapters regarding the persistence of dimensionality is the increasing power of agenda control, and the increasing likelihood of gridlock. Riker’s (1986) *The Art of Political Manipulation* explores the idea of “heresthetics” or political strategy, and makes a case for how adding an additional dimension to a consideration can change the underlying coalitions and conditions. If the modern Congress, even with its polarization, still contains extra dimensions of preferences, these dimensions can be exploited to create gridlock. Theoretically, two dimensions of preferences create “chaos”

(McKelvy 1976) and create an opportunity for floor leaders to craft an agenda to reach policy goals. In earlier periods of Congress, the second dimension was perhaps the most important dynamic. The 1808 clause in *The Constitution* and the successive compromises regarding slavery provide an example of how some dimensions are gagged to prohibit this stalemate. Yet if dimensions are only part of a story that is mainly about liberal-conservative, “big” v “small” government concerns, they may still be exploited.

Finally, this analysis has attempted to reach important questions about the nature of representation in Congress. The previous chapters have explored the representation of Latinos, primary voters, abortion advocates and of the general election constituency. On certain policy votes, we can see an impact for these groups. That is largely good news. But, as Arnold (1990) noted, inattentive and attentive publics may have different preferences, and the a reduced scope of conflict may create an upper-class bias (Schattschneider 1960). In a polarized era, with gerrymandered house districts and partisan state populations, we may expect MCs to depart from their own ideology in favor of their primary voters as Chapter Four and the case of Sen. Pat Roberts explored.

Further Research

As the quote from Fenno implored at the beginning of this chapter, understanding the concept of “representation” and its quality within the U.S.

Congress should be an important goal for legislative scholars. While many scholars would like the freedom to conduct research in the manner that Fenno and Kingdon have, the current state of research does not prioritize these descriptive findings, and publishing demands would not give most researchers the time. But if understanding representation is given value within quantitative studies of Congress and scholars are unafraid to make normative claims on the state of our democracy, the field and its students will be strengthened.

The policy categories listed here are obviously not the only regionally based issues that can impact what it is largely a unidimensional Congress. Further, issues like the biodiesel subsidies considered in Chapter Three may fade from view as others emerge. Research that examines the rise of new policy issues and the ideological content (or lack of content) may be important. Recent policy issues like government surveillance, drones, or net-neutrality have created coalitions of liberals and libertarians and do not fit nicely on a single dimension.

Finally, students of history and public policy should join the discussion of institutionalists scholars of Congress to interpret the behavior, social dynamics, policy implications and historical significance of single votes. While the exploration of primary source material in this research lacked the depth of an historian's analysis, making use of the *Congressional Record*, press releases, emails and tweets (an archive is now maintained at the Library of Congress) can be an

important avenue to exploring the concept of a representative's "Home Style" in the future.

Conclusion: Understanding Issue Politics in a Polarized Congress

Even in the polarized era of the modern Congress, diverse and dispersed cultural and economic interests interact with multiple principals to create incentives for MCs to prioritize constituency-based concerns above their own ideology.

Individual issue areas like environmental conservation, energy subsidies or immigration policy may be particularly salient in some areas of the US and not in others, and be prioritized by some groups and not others. The regularity of a single-dimensional voting structure with increasingly divided parties has dampened this dynamic, but is unlikely to silence it in a multi-cultural democracy.

Issues that create economic benefits for some regions at the expense of others may lead members of Congress to vote against their usual ideological viewpoints. The uneven layering of political cultures may have similar effects when considering issues like immigration and abortion. Even if the spread of these cultural or economic values is relatively similar across most districts, individual districts or states with ideological extreme primary voters or an active issue public may create additional competing incentives for MCs. These complex

interactions are unlikely to be satisfactorily explained with a one, or even two-dimensional model of preferences.

The voting calculus of MCs continues to be an important topic of interest within the subfield of congressional studies. Questioning both the conventional wisdom of the layperson as well as the assumptions and interpretations of leading theories and theorists is an important part of the scientific process. In the natural sciences, physicists still operate based on the “Standard Model” that has not fully incorporated the gravitational ideas in Einstein’s general relativity. Social scientists cannot, and likely do not, expect a full and universal theory as physicist might. But by challenging the assumptions and unexplained observations created by a dominant perspective, the scholarly community as a whole can benefit. This work has attempted to ask questions and test a leading theory against alternate explanations. In significant ways, the ideologists perspective on congressional voting is lacking. Yet even from a critical perspective, this confirms the major observations and expectations of the theory. As new research tools and statistical methods are incorporated into the field, the current perspective may be the Newton to a future Einstein. Moving forward, it is essential that research focuses on the personal and dynamic nature of legislative representation, rather than the birds-eye view of the institution that too often dominates contemporary congressional scholarship.

Endnotes

¹ Portions of this chapter come from the author's M.A. thesis at the University of Kansas "Dimensionality in Congressional Voting: The Role of Issues and Agendas" (2012).

² The 110th Senate had 16 women and 1 black member, the rest were white males. The 114th (2015-2016) Congress will be 80% white, 80% male, and 92% Christian, earning it the label of "the most diverse Congress in history."

³ An over sample of competitive districts would have biased the results of the multivariate analysis. Most districts do not see competitive House elections. A total of 15 of the 100 districts in the random sample would be considered "competitive." Due to missing values, the models contain 52 Republicans and 43-44 Democrats cases for analysis.

⁴ Obviously, convention participants from both parties have strong partisan attachments. To correct for possible bias in the responses, informant responses were regressed using a party dummy variable. Subtracting that coefficient from the responses allows to adjust for the average partisan bias in each question, and approximate the measure that of an independent expert.

⁵ "Primary Extremism" = $|4 - (\text{"incumbents party primary voter ideology; purged mean"})|$; you can see this data graphically in Figure One.

⁶ Stone's survey also included a measure of general election ideology for each district. When this variable was used instead of the Kerry vote share measure the model showed nearly identical results, with no key variables changing in direction of impact or statistical significance.

⁷ The simulation was conducted using the *Zelig* software package (Imai, King, and Lau 2007, 2009). 100,000 cases were simulated to the same specifications as the first two models in Table One. The precision of the estimation is demonstrated by the presence of 95% confidence intervals. To plot the two groups, simulations were conducted on each of the ADA models separately. The range of observed values of the primary ideology variables was used to simulate ADA scores. Democrats observed values (0.05972-2.821); Republican observed values (0.964-2.843).

⁸ 109th Congress S. 403; Passed in the House as "Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act", 9/26/06; Passed in the Senate as "Child Custody Protection Act", 7/25/06.

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Appendix One: Public Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) Topic Coding

Topic/Variable Name	PIPC Codes	Content Examples
Rural	200-209	Agriculture Subsidies, Farm Credit
Energy & Environment	600-692	Offshore Oil, Superfund, Nuclear Waste, Clean Air Act
Civil Rights	720-739	Criminal Procedures, Civil Rights Act, Busing
Crime	751-769	Drug Control, Law Enforcement Assistance
Agriculture	910-919	Farm Labor, Production Controls, Price Supports
Foreign Policy	400-499	Foreign Aid, State Department, Human Rights, Sanctions
Gun Control	750	Gun Control
Abortion	947-948	Family Planning, Abortion
Baseline Issues Not Included:		
Symbolic	0-99	Impeachment, Committees, Ethics
Appropriations	100-199 210-299	All Appropriations Issue Codes except "Rural" appropriations (200-209)
Defense	300-399	NASA, Weapons Procurement, Intelligence
Economy, Taxes and Budget	500-592	Misc. Tax Policy, Foreign Trade, Financial Regulations, Debt, Budget Resolutions
Government Operations, Civil Rights, Justice	700-719 740-740 770-779 780-781	Government Benefits and Employee Pay Campaign Finance, FEC Lobbying, Scandals (Watergate/Whitewater) Homeland Security
Welfare and Human Services	800-869	Social Security, HUD, Education
Misc. Domestic	900-909 920-939 940-946 950-959 960-969 970-999	Federalism, Revenue Sharing Transportation, Women's Issues Health and Human Services Arts and Public TV; NSF Labor Relations Consumer Issues, Misc.